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ABSTRACT 
Oikonomou, Emmanouil, M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, January 
2008. Freedom to Operate and Canola Breeding in Canada.  
 
Supervisor: Dr. Murray E. Fulton 
 
The Canadian canola breeding sector met a transition from publicly funded 
breeding research to large private investments in research and development (R&D). The 
increasing use of biotechnology tools in the mid 1990s made the assignment of plant 
ownership technically possible while the legislative safeguards that were put in place 
during the same period enabled owners to take juristic actions against potential 
infringers. Today, canola breeding sector is dominated by large multinational firms. The 
generation of proprietary knowledge in the canola breeding sector has caused a freedom 
to operate issue. Private and public firms conducting canola R&D are seriously 
concerned about their ability to gain and preserve access to key technologies in an IPR 
world.   
 This thesis uses the tragedy of the anticommons framework to analyze the 
consequences of increased intellectual property protection in the canola breeding sector. 
Theory suggests that when a common resource is owned by multiple owners, each of the 
owners has the incentive to overcharge potential users, leading to the underuse of the 
resource. In R&D, different owners of complementary technologies may overcharge 
potential R&D firms that want to assemble different technological pieces to produce a 
new one. The result is forgoing research and development of new products. 
 The results of personal interviews with eleven canola researchers and IP officers 
are presented and analyzed. The results suggest that the increase in the intellectual 
property protection in the last two decades in the canola breeding sector has led to 
difficulties with canola R&D. These difficulties take the form of reduced access to 
current, proprietary and public material. With hampered access to research input 
material, research output is not maximized and potential research may be forgone. 
Interviewees described how the increase in the intellectual property protection affects 
their personal and organization’s ability to conduct research as well as some the 
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implications of the new IP regime on the canola breeding sector. There is indication that 
canola breeding sector is moving towards a super-protectionism. Under these conditions, 
canola R&D firms, private and public, are in search for ways that will open access to 
enabling technologies and research areas. The creation of platform technologies and 
collaborations are the most prominent ones and are observed to increase in occurrence 
world wide. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background Information 
Research in Canadian agriculture had its origins in the agricultural colleges established 
throughout Canada during the second half of the 19th century (Wallace, 1948). 
Agriculture was introduced into the schools of Upper Canada as early as 1847 and has 
continued to play a part in the curricula of schools and universities from that date until 
present (Wallace, 1948). While the work conducted at these schools was useful, it was 
inadequate to cover the need for agricultural research (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 
2007). In 1886 Parliament passed a bill establishing five experimental farms (The 
Canadian Encyclopedia, 2007). Over time research centres were established throughout 
Canada, conducting research and contributing to the development of the agri-food 
industry (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2007). A century and a half after the foundation 
of the first agricultural college, Canada had agricultural schools and universities in the 
provinces of Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta, British Columbia and 
Saskatchewan (Wallace, 1948) as well as a network of research centers that were 
strategically placed in almost every province (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2007) .    
The public funding of agriculture research and development emerged due to the 
public good nature of innovation. Prior to the mid 1980s, there were no technical and 
institutional means that would effectively assign ownership of new plant varieties to the 
developers. The result was the well known free rider problem. Private firms had no 
incentives to undertake agricultural R&D since they had no way to collect revenue on 
the varieties that they developed. Given the inability of the market to motivate private 
involvement in agricultural R&D, the public sector’s intervention was required. The 
establishment of public institutions such as the Canadian Department of Agriculture 
(now known as Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC)) and the National Research 
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Center (NRC), as well as a number of universities, enabled a systematic production of 
innovation and new knowledge that added value to the agriculture sector. 
A good example of the impact that innovation has on agriculture is the 
development of canola. Canola, originally rapeseed, is an oilseed that grows in cool 
climates such as those of Canada, Poland and Germany. In Canada, canola is grown in 
the provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec and 
Ontario. Rapeseed bears two characteristics that render it unsuitable for human 
consumption and animal feeding: the first one is its high erucic acid and the second one 
is its high glucosinolate content. Extensive research in rapeseed enabled the breeding of 
new rapeseed varieties with low levels of erucic acid and glucosinolates thereby making 
it suitable for human consumption and animal feeding. Today, canola is a major source 
of edible oil for many countries including Canada. 
The history of canola industry has another key feature that makes it distinct and 
interesting; it has experienced two quite different property right regimes, one with 
relatively high freedom to operate and one with strong intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). During the first of the two regimes the canola industry was developed as a result 
of efforts undertaken by public organizations such as Agriculture Canada, NRC and the 
Rapeseed Association of Canada (RAC) (Gray et al., 2001). The breeding of new 
varieties with low erucic acid (2% or less) and low glucosinolate content (30 μmol/g or 
less) that transformed rapeseed to an oil suitable for human consumption and animal 
feeding was a result of the public sector’s initiative and endeavour (Gray et al., 2001). 
At the breeding level, knowledge and germplasm were moved among scientists 
relatively freely (Gray et al., 2001). Trading among breeders was implemented 
informally and saved breeders from paperwork and tedious negotiations.  
The advances in biotechnology and the introduction of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) brought about many changes in the canola industry starting in the 1980s. 
During that period, a series of enactments that protected propagating material, such as 
the Patent Act and Plant Breeder’s Rights (PBRs) took place. Newly developed genes 
could now be protected by the law and, through that, the whole plant containing these 
genes could be protected. As well, advances in biotechnology allowed varieties to be 
identified by their genetic make-up. These two developments meant that the means were 
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now in place to allow firms to identify ownership and protect intellectual products. The 
result was that private firms begun to invest in R&D. Competition among R&D firms 
dictated an aggressive behavior towards patenting of research material. The canola 
industry evolved to its current form where a few large multinational companies 
dominate the sector and are the major force in the development of new varieties and 
products.  
A comparison of the two regimes in the canola industry offers an excellent 
opportunity to examine the impact of changes in the way that information and new 
technologies are exchanged under different technological and ownership conditions. 
More specifically, the following questions can be asked: Has the introduction and use of 
IPRs affected breeders’ access to research tools/germplasm? Do breeders have freedom 
to operate? Is there sharing going on among breeders?  
1.2. Problem Statement 
The assignment of IPRs is based on the rationale of providing incentives to private 
actors to undertake R&D by allowing them to temporarily capture the monopoly profits 
accruing from the commercialization of the inventions. By bestowing the innovative 
firm with ownership of its intellectual products, IPRs deter possible intellectual theft, 
thus making the recoupment of the cost possible. At the same time, by setting a finite 
time period for the duration of the IPRs, the benefits accruing from the innovation will 
be diffused to society through competition. 
During the period of intellectual property protection, however, IPRs have been 
hypothesized (and in some cases observed) to have an adverse impact on the 
researcher’s ability to build upon the work of others (see Shapiro (2001), Heller and 
Eisenberg (1998), Leger, (2007)). A researcher’s freedom to operate and conduct 
research is threatened by the proprietary nature of the produced knowledge. The 
increasing volume of issued patents, PBRs and other means of intellectual protection has 
placed researchers on alert in order not to infringe IPRs that cover part of or aspects of 
their invention. Moreover, the owner of an innovation may be unwilling to share or 
license the product under protection.  
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Even if the technology can be shared, access to proprietary knowledge by third 
parties often requires the payment of a royalty fee to its owner. When the amount 
requested is more than the researcher/R&D firm can afford, further innovation may not 
take place. This holds particularly true when the creation of a new technology requires 
the use of a number of different technological pieces. The gathering of different 
technologies is costly and may never be realized because each owner has an incentive to 
overcharge on the permission to use the protected technology (Buchanan and Yoon, 
2000).  
 The difficulties encountered by researchers in accessing knowledge have led 
economists to examine the freedom to operate issue. Pardey et al. (2003) examine 
freedom to operate in agriculture biotechnology in the developing countries. Nottenburg, 
Pardey and Wright address the issue of non-profit organizations’ freedom to operate, 
while Menon studies the access to and transfer of genetic resources. Lastly, Sederoff and 
Meagher look into the possible constraints to R&D caused by blocked access to 
biotechnology. 
1.3. Objective of the Study 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the freedom to operate among plant 
breeders in the canola industry in Western Canada. More specifically, the thesis 
examines the degree to which IPRs held by R&D private and public firms in agriculture 
is making it difficult for plant breeders to carry out their research. 
 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
- to examine canola breeders’ access to current, public and proprietary research 
material; 
- to investigate the current flow of knowledge among canola breeders and among 
organizations conducting canola R&D; 
- to examine collaborations in canola R&D and their impact on research; and 
- to improve our understanding regarding IPRs and the way(s) they affect research 
in the canola sector. 
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1.4. Methodology 
To carry out the above objectives, a survey of people involved in canola R&D was 
employed. Twelve scientists and IP officers involved in canola breeding in and around 
Saskatoon were interviewed and surveyed. 
 The survey consisted of five parts. In the first part, interviewees provided 
descriptive data such as the area of breeding (traditional, biotech or both) they were 
engaged in, the number of research tools they have invented and the distribution of their 
funding among basic, applied research and development. The second part of the survey 
asked questions about the extent to which inventions in canola breeding are protected by 
intellectual property rights and the reasons that lead breeders/organizations to select 
particular types of protection. In part three, information regarding contracts and 
collaborative activity was collected, including questions regarding the impact that 
collaborations have on research programs and interviewee’s intellectual property 
protection activity. The fourth part of the questionnaire collected data on the 
interviewees’ freedom to operate, including the ability/inability to obtain the necessary 
research tools and their willingness to share their inventions with other canola breeders. 
The fifth part of the questionnaire dealt with the costs and benefits of having stronger 
IPRs. The survey also added a number of open-ended questions regarding the strategies 
used by the canola breeders or their organizations to limit the adverse effects of IPRs 
and whether the current IP system makes the best use of knowledge.  
1.5. Thesis organization 
The remaining chapters of the thesis are organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a 
description of the crop research and plant breeding environment from 1940, when the 
first applications for rapeseed appeared, until today. During this period the canola 
industry underwent a number of structural changes, moving from a relatively minor crop 
to one of the major crops in the country. Chapter 3 sets out the methodology used for the 
study and outlines the details of the survey. Chapter 4 presents the theoretical structures 
used to explain and interpret the research findings. The theory deploys the tragedy of the 
anticommons theory (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) and the pyramid framework (Shapiro, 
2001) to illustrate how property rights can potentially constrain downstream research. 
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Chapter 5 analyzes both quantitative and qualitative data obtained from the survey using 
the theoretical building blocks presented in chapter 4. It focuses mainly on the negative 
impact of IPRs on research activity. Chapter 6 examines the implications of the findings 
on IPRs and freedom to operate. Lastly, Chapter 7 summarizes the findings and 
concludes the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN 
CANOLA RESEARCH 
2.1. Introduction 
Many economists maintain that insightful analysis of economic growth cannot be 
conducted using only the two traditional factors of production, capital and labour 
(Schumpeter, 1954, Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Contemporary economic prosperity 
in particular has been observed to depend increasingly on the creation and circulation of 
knowledge. The transformation of rapeseed to canola and the development of the canola 
market is an especially illustrative example of how the systematic production and 
exploitation of knowledge can lead to economic growth (see Phillips and 
Khachatourians, 2001). This chapter, then, describes how a crop that initially had a 
number of undesirable quality properties has become an international multi-billion 
dollar business. 
2.2. The canola research environment, 1940-1985 
A number of different factors provided an initial boost to canola production in the early 
1940s. First, the Second World War created a need for oil used to lubricate marine steam 
engines, and rapeseed oil had been found to be the best lubricant available because it 
could cling to water and steam-wasted metal surfaces (White, 1974). Second, for much 
of the war, trade routes between Europe and Canada were broken or insecure, limiting 
rapeseed oil supplies from Europe to Canada. Thus, during the war the demand for 
rapeseed oil remained high. After the war, farmers in Western Canada sought to 
diversify their crop production (at that time they were limited mostly to growing wheat 
and barley) (Khachatourians et al., 2001), and so a rather favourable economic 
environment existed for developing Canada’s rapeseed industry. 
Despite wartime demands, rapeseed was not yet a major oilseed crop. Its 
application was still limited to industrial uses, and even at that its future seemed limited.
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After the war, demand decreased as more efficient combustion engines replaced steam 
engines, and petroleum products, whose supplies were once again more accessible, 
competed against rapeseed lubricants (Malla, 1996). The only way for rapeseed to 
become a viable economic endeavour was to extend its use. Investment however was 
required to develop new uses. 
For the private sector, economic incentives were both small and obscure. In the 
post-war period, there were no quantifiable returns for canola research and development, 
and such uncertainty made it unattractive to private investment (Phillips and 
Khachatourians, 2001). Furthermore, a lack of legal protection for intellectual property 
rights that would secure the capture of economic rents by the owners deterred private 
sector involvement in the canola research industry. The only significant role that private 
companies played was in the area of oil processing, with minor participation from 
Edible Oils Ltd, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, and Canada Packers (Gray et al., 2001). 
All but by default, this left the impetus on the public sector to develop the industry. 
The public sector dominated canola research in the period 1944-1984. The vast 
majority of research funding came from the public sector, particularly between 1944 and 
1973 (see Table 2.1). New varieties were developed virtually exclusively by public 
institutions (Table 2.2) and were made freely available to the public. 
 
Table 2.1. Investment in Canadian canola research by funding source and over 
selected periods. 
 
Investment by 
 
1944-1966 
 
1967-1973 
 
1974-1989 
 
1990-1998 
Millions CAN$ 1998     
  Public sector 85 80 58 39 
  Private sector 15 17 40 59 
  Associations 0 2.5 2.2 2 
Source: Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001.
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Table 2.2. Canola varieties developed by institution. 
Years 1940-1959 
1960-
1969 
1970-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995 1996 1997 
Number of varieties developed 
63% 
11% 
29 
31 
2 
Source: Phillips and Khachatoutians, 2001 (market shares do not add up to 100% due to the share of the acreage not 
being reported to specific varieties; private market share is probably underreported as a result). 
  Private companies 0% 0% 0.2% 0.7% 0.4% 43% 57% 61% 
  Public institutions 100% 100% 99.8% 99% 98% 49% 27% 26% 
  Private companies 0 0 0 0 9 32 18 28 
  Total all institutions 4 6 8 6 19 44 20 32 
  Public institutions 4 6 8 6 10 12 2 4 
Market share by institution 
 
 
 
 
 
The involvement of the Canadian government in canola research activity came 
about, in part, due to a perception that development of an edible oil source was a matter 
of national security (National Research Council, 1992). The main obstacle related to the 
suitability of rapeseed oil for edible purposes was the high content in rapeseed oil of 
erucic acid (20%-55%) which was believed to have adverse effects on human health 
when consumed. 
Studies recognizing the adverse impacts of rapeseed oil consumption date back 
to 1956, when K.K. Caroll, Department of Medical Research, University of Western 
Ontario, found links to reduced weight gain, fatty heart, increased cholesterol, and 
increased weight of adrenal glands in rats (Sauer and Kramer, 1983). This and other 
health studies forced canola breeders to change their focus from the agronomic traits of 
rapeseed to the development of a variety with low erucic acid. This need to shift 
research focus was affirmed at the International Rapeseed Conference in 1970, where a 
group of European scientists presented a study indicating that high erucic rapeseed oil 
consumption by young animals caused a short-term fat build-up around the heart and 
kidneys that appeared to cause long-term muscle lesions in the heart (Gray et al., 2001).  
The necessity for pushing canola research in a specific direction of development 
was obvious, but it lacked a central institution that could organize, fund, and direct such 
an effort. There was no actor whose interests were large enough to undertake such a 
venture independently. Farmers, processors, and handlers had small interests 
individually, but collectively they were not organized well to fuel and shape 
development of the canola sector (Gray et al., 2001). These groups found their voice 
through the Rapeseed Association of Canada (RAC), which was established in 1967. 
RAC partnered with other public institutions in this period, such as Agriculture 
Canada, the National Research Council (NRC), and universities. By 1968, this effort had 
resulted in the development of the first low erucic B. napus variety by Drs. Downey 
(Agriculture and Agri-food Canada) and Steffansson (University of Manitoba). 
Agriculture Canada and RAC continued their efforts, and by 1974 ninety-five percent of 
the changeover to low erucic varieties was complete (NRC, 1992). 
The second major drawback that rapeseed had was the presence of glucosinolates 
in the seed. Once the oil was extracted, the meal component that was left over contained 
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glucosinolates. In the mid 1950s, it was found proof of high correlation between 
glucosinolate concentration and thyroid disorders (NRC, 1992). At about the same time, 
other research showed that glucosinolate compounds also affected the general well-
being of the animal (NRC, 1992). In 1967, seeds from plants of the Bronowski variety 
(B. napus) were found to be low in glucosinolates. This genetic source for low 
glucosinolates content was then utilized to develop low erucic, low glucosinolate 
varieties (Canola Council of Canada, 2005). In 1974, University of Manitoba registered 
Tower, the first B. napus variety with both low erucic acid and low glucosinolates. In 
the following years two more “double low” varieties were registered, Candle (B. rapa) 
and Regent. Once rapeseed varieties with low erucic acid and glucosinolates had been 
bred and after further research on dropping erucic acid and glucosinolate content levels 
had been carried out, the Rapeseed Association registered the name ‘canola’ for 
rapeseed varieties with 2% or less erucic acid and 30 μmol or less glucosinolates (Gray 
et al., 2001).  
The research environment was vital to this breakthrough. Researchers from 
public institutions freely exchanged ideas, knowledge, germplasm, and other inventions 
related to the breeding sector (Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001). Ongoing projects 
were openly discussed and collaborations evolved through mutual interest to achieve a 
specific outcome. The public character of the research provided breeders with a common 
goal: the development of canola varieties that would benefit Canadian society.  
2.3. Legislation activity since the 1980s  
After a quarter-century of dominance in rapeseed research and developing the canola 
market, public sector involvement reached its peak in the 1990s. Cutbacks in public 
funding during the 1990s and the large investments required for research and 
development in canola restricted further public sector influence (Gray et al., 2001). 
Concurrent with this funding shift, a biotechnology revolution was underway and 
its impact on plant breeding was promising. Biotechnology innovations significantly 
reduced the time needed to develop new canola varieties. Advances in breeding 
techniques and new research tools also made breeding programs more cost effective. 
More importantly, biotechnology opened the way for the application of intellectual 
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property protection in plant breeding, as it provided scientists with the tools to identify 
ownership of the seeds. These changes made the canola industry more appealing to 
private investors. The final piece that private companies needed before entering the 
marketplace was a means of protecting their investment from intellectual theft. 
Prior to the 1990s, legal protection of plant varieties was relatively weak. In 
Canada, the Seeds Act of 1923 required that only registered varieties could be sold 
(Kuyek, 2004). New varieties could only be registered if they satisfied certain quality 
standards (Kuyek, 2004). The provisions of the act were designed to validate the identity 
of a new variety and determine its suitability for seed certification (CFIA, 2005). 
However, it did not provide protection to the owner of a new seed from possible 
infringers.  
In the United States, the only forms of protection at that time were the Plant 
Patent Act (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), enacted in 1930 and 
1970 respectively. The PPA provides for a “plant patent” and is limited only to 
asexually produced plant varieties, while the PVPA provides for a certificate of plant 
variety protection only to sexually reproduced plant varieties. Even though the two acts 
provide some form of varietal protection, they contain certain deficiencies compared to 
utility patents. The description requirements for plant patents are less rigourous than 
those of utility patents, and unlike utility patents PVPA certificates cannot exclude all 
commercial uses of the protected variety (Kjeldgaard and Marsh, 1994). Utility patents 
fulfill these conditions, but are not applicable to plants. Hence, there was a need for a 
more consistent and coherent form of protection for plant varieties. This, however, did 
not come to pass until 1985, when the Patent and Trademark Office’s Board of Appeals 
and Interferences’ case of Ex Parte Hibberd (227 U.S.P.Q 433 [P.T.O Bd. App. And 
Inter. 1985]) allowed for the patenting of artificially modified plants, both in the 
traditional manner as well as through biotechnological plant breeding.  
In Canada, unlike the United States, the patenting of higher life forms (i.e., 
plants and animals) is prohibited. However, the Canadian Patent Act of 1985 allows the 
granting of patents for research material such as modified genes, gene sequences, 
promoters, or plant cells, which can be used as a means of controlling the entire plant  
(as found in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004). The granting of patents to 
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biological organisms and genes was established by the 1982 decision of the 
Commissioner of Patents who ruled that claims made by Abitibi Co for a yeast culture 
and by Connaught Laboratories for a cell culture were patentable (Duy, 2001). 
Responding to the lack of an alternative form of intellectual protection that 
would be both plant specific and provide protection to new varieties, the Canadian 
government passed the Plant Breeder’s Rights Act (PBRA) in 1990. The PBRA grants 
exclusive rights to the holder of a plant variety, and allows the holder to sell or produce 
for sale propagating material of the plant variety and make use of it to produce another 
plant variety for commercial purposes. PBRs leave the door open for researchers to use 
freely this material for research purposes and for farmers to keep propagating material as 
a seed source for subsequent seasons. These two implicit exemptions, known as 
“breeder’s exemption” and “farmers’ privilege,” distinguish PBRs from patents, 
rendering the former a weaker form of protection (Forge, 2005). Nevertheless, PBRs are 
widely used in Canada, particularly by the private sector, providing an additional option 
for varietal protection.  
Another form of intellectual property rights for plants is the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, established in 1961 by the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). Since that 
initial effort, there have been a number of amendments, the most notable coming in 
1978 and 1991. Canada acceded to UPOV in 1992, but still needs to bring the PBRA in 
agreement with the Convention for ratification. The aim of the Convention is to 
recognize and ensure the breeder of a new plant variety the right to protect it either by 
granting a special title of protection or patent. Unlike the PBRA, the UPOV in its most 
recent form explicitly allows exceptions to “acts for experimental purposes” (article 15 
(1)), but limits farmers’ privilege by making it an optional exception (Forge, 2005).  
The series of IPR enactments offered potential for private investments in the 
canola sector in the 1990s. Seed companies could file canola varieties with new traits 
and agrochemical firms could patent modified genes resistant to certain herbicides (e.g., 
Monsanto’s Round-up Ready®). The assignment of intellectual property rights to private 
developers was one of the two main factors that encouraged private investors to enter 
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the canola industry. The other one was the development and application of 
biotechnology in canola breeding.  
2.4. The period 1985-2007 
Breakthroughs in biotechnology and its application to several crops, including canola, 
brought about major changes in agriculture. More specifically, the emergence of 
transgenic plants—plants with foreign genes introduced to provide enhanced traits—
have eased the plant breeding process and enabled the insertion of desirable 
characteristics both for the benefit of producers and consumers.  
The first method for transferring genes into plants was discovered by Horsch et 
al. in 1985 who successfully transformed and regenerated petunia, tobacco and tomato 
plants. A key feature of the method used was a soil bacterium, Agrobacterium 
tumefaciens, the action of which enabled the transfer of genetic material to plants 
(Davey 1989). The application of this revolutionary method to canola occurred for the 
first time in 1987 by Fry et al., who produced the first transformed Brassica napus plant. 
After this event the development of transgenic canola seeds took off. Multinational 
private firms such as Monsanto and Bayer saw commercial value in the production of 
transgenic seeds resistant to certain herbicides such as glyphosate and glufosinate. 
Monsanto developed Round Up Ready® canola, a variety resistant to glyphosate while 
Bayer developed Liberty®, which is resistant to glufosinate (Keller, 2007). The first 
field tests for Round Up Ready® and Liberty® took place in 1988 and 1990 while the 
varieties were registered in 1996 and 1995 correspondingly (Keller, 2007).  
In addition to the transgenic HT variaties Round Up Ready® and Liberty®, 
Clearfield®, a third type of HT variety was developed in 1995. Clearfield® is resistant 
to imidazolinone herbicide which is used to control weeds in several crops including 
wheat, maize, rice, oilseed rape and others (USDA, 2007). In contrast to Round Up 
Ready® and Liberty® varieties which are transgenics, Clearfield® was developed using 
mutagenesis and selection (USDA, 2007). These three HT varieties consist the bulk of 
canola varieties grown in Canada today.  
The benefits to farmers resulting from the development of herbicide resistant 
canola varieties were many. To begin with, Round Up® Ready and Liberty® are non-
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selective herbicides meaning that a wide spectrum of weed can be managed (University 
of Nebraska, 2002). Such broad spectrum control is particularly important in no-till 
systems and weedy fields (University of Nebraska, 2002). Secondly, the introduction of 
herbicide tolerant (HT) crops resulted in a price reduction for conventional herbicides 
(University of Nebraska, 2002). The price reduction is the result of the market 
adjustment and an attempt by companies to remain competitive with herbicides used on 
non-herbicide tolerant crops (University of Nebraska, 2002). In general, glyphosate and 
glufosinate have lower toxicity to humans and animals compared to some other 
herbicides (University of Nebraska, 2002). Since they are readily absorbed by the 
organic particles in the soil and decompose rapidly, they pose little danger due to 
leaching and contamination of ground water or toxicity to wildlife (University of 
Nebraska, 2002).     
 The above benefits of HT varieties motivated farmers to rapidly adopt the new 
seeds. Figure 2.1 illustrates the increased use of HT technology that took place in 
Canada for canola during the period 1995-2005.  
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Figure 2.1. Percentage usage of herbicide tolerant (HT) Brassica napus canola in 
Canada (1995 – 2005). 
Source: W. Keller, 2007. 
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As figure 2.1 shows, during the early years of HT technology there was a steep 
increase in its use by the farmers. By 1999, four years after the introduction of HT to the 
market, HT canola accounted for more than 70% of the total canola acreage. By 2005 
HT canola dominated production with 95% of total acreage. 
 Another technological breakthrough that has affected the production of canola is 
the use of hybrid technology for the production of hybrid canola varieties. A canola 
hybrid is the result of crossbreeding two lines of canola (Canola Council of Canada, 
2005). When crossing two parents there is a possibility to obtain an offspring with 
enhanced characteristics (also known as hybrid vigour or heterosis). In canola, hybrid 
varieties are produced using controlled breeding such as cutoplasmic male sterility 
(CMS), plant genetic system (PGS) and synthetics. The resulting hybrid varieties from 
these processes have shown increased yields of up to 15-20% (Keller, 2007).  
Another characteristic of hybrid seeds is that they do not maintain their genetic 
composition for the next year, making it very costly for farmers to keep the seed. This 
characteristic is important for the company developing the seed since they are assured a 
demand for seed every year. In the last five to six years, hybrid varieties have been 
rapidly adopted by canola growers. Figure 2.2 illustrates the adoption of hybrid varieties 
at the expense of the open-pollinated varieties. 
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Figure 2.2. Rate of Hybrid Adoption in Canada. 
Source: Canola Council of Canada. 
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 In recent years, the application of genomics in plant breeding has occurred. 
Genomics is the study of the complete sequence of DNA, including all of the genes, of 
an organism (NRC, 2007). In plant breeding, genomics provide the opportunity to 
intervene on the plant germplasm and modify targeted characteristics with greater 
precision and rapidity (Baima, 2005). Current efforts from research institutions such as 
Genome Canada focus on the generation of various genomic resources (e.g. microarrays, 
ESTs, markers) that help to identify a large number of new genes (Keller, 2007). The 
identification of a plant’s genes is critical, since they control important functions and 
characteristics such as seed vigor, plant architecture, seed composition and oil content 
(Keller, 2007). The introduction of new characteristics in a plant affects its economic, 
nutritional and health value.   
 Genomics are increasingly being used in canola breeding. In Canada, the federal 
government has initiated genomics research within federal labs such as the Genomics 
and Health Initiative (GHI) in NRC and the Crop Genomics Initiative (CGI) in AAFC. 
Investments in these two initiatives are approximately $50 million Canadian (Keller, 
2007). NRC and AAFC have recently submitted a joint collection of 597,000 Brassica 
napus ESTs which represents nearly 90% of all submitted Brassica ESTs (NRC, 2007). 
ESTs provide researcher with a view of the “functional” parts of a genome where gene 
expression takes place (NRC, 2007). By using ESTs to study how genes are expressed 
within canola, it is then possible to manipulate these genes in order to enrich canola with 
desirable traits (NRC, 2007). According to Keller (2007), the commercialization of new 
traits will be more prominent after 2015, as the current stage is confined to the 
development of prototypes.  
The application of new biotechnology processes to canola and the new IP regime 
in plants, gave rise to large private investments. Concurrent with a decline in public 
R&D, the result was that by the late 1990s, private companies accounted for almost half 
the developed varieties and half the independent breeding programs producing at least 
one commercial variety (Table 2.3). Large and often vertically integrated multinationals 
managed a large portion of the supply chain and controlled a series of productive 
activities (e.g., seed industry, production of herbicides). This required a strong and solid 
base to enable large research and development investments that might yield improved or 
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differentiated end products. These research and development initiatives have resulted in 
scientific breakthroughs that have contributed to the advancement of the sector. Many 
involved in the industry agree that such investments would never have been undertaken 
by the public sector, nor would the resulting technological improvements have been 
achieved.  
In addition to consolidation, private sector firms are also engaging in large-scale 
collaborations. In March 2007, Monsanto and BASF announced a long-term joint R&D 
project worth $1.5 billion to examine the development of high yielding crops and crops 
that are more tolerant to environmental stresses such as droughts (Food Navigator, 
2007). A second example is a Monsanto-Dow collaboration for the development of 
SmartStax™ corn. The new variety will incorporate eight different herbicide tolerance 
and insect-protection genes from both companies (Food Navigator, 2007). The venture 
supposes that both firms will cross license under royalty agreements linked to their 
insect protection systems and weed control systems (Food Navigator, 2007). The value 
of these cross-licenses is in the billions of dollars.  
 
Table 2.3. Independent breeding programs producing at least one commercial 
variety per year. 
 B. napus  B. rapa 
 Private Public  Private Public 
1950-1959 0 1  0 1 
1960-1969 0 2  0 2 
1970-1979 0 2  0 1 
1980-1984 0 3  0 1 
1985-1989 5 4  2 1 
1990-1994 13 3  3 3 
1995-1998 14 3  3 1 
Source: Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001. 
 
On the other hand, increased private research and development activity has 
generated greater proprietary knowledge. As innovations take place in private 
laboratories, entrepreneurs want to ensure that their intellectual products are protected. 
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The generation of proprietary knowledge, however, is still something relatively new to 
the canola sector. The transition from a regime where publicly bred varieties were freely 
distributed to farmers to one where large multinationals make heavy investments in 
research and development and appropriate its products implies a whole series of changes 
in the market structure (e.g., mergers, takeovers), supply chain, firm organization and 
behavior, the public sector’s role, and the way that scientific research and application is 
conducted. 
The focus of this study is an examination of the impact of increased proprietary 
knowledge on plant breeding. The questions that this study will address include: Do 
canola breeders have access to vital research material under the new regime of IPRs? 
Does the existence of multiple IP owners may block the gathering of dispersed IP 
pieces, thereby limiting development?
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Introduction 
In plant breeding, as in other R&D industries, knowledge is both an input and an output 
(Shapiro, 2001). Breeders use various research tools to breed new varieties, discover 
new traits or invent advanced research tools. When plant breeding takes place in an IP 
free environment where access to inputs is costless, the two roles of knowledge do not 
conflict with one another. Available research output can be freely used by other 
scientists for further research. When knowledge becomes proprietary, research output is 
still produced or enhanced; however, its proprietary nature may hinder it from being 
used as an input. The research and development of new products may require the use of 
various research tools owned by different research organizations. In many instances, 
these technologies are not available to researchers either because the owners have 
decided not to share/trade or because there are costs associated with their acquirement. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the implications of proprietary knowledge in 
canola R&D in the light of its dual role as an input and output.  
The chapter begins with a classification of goods as public, private, toll or 
common pool. This distinction is useful in understanding why IPR legislation was 
introduced in the 1980s and what that introduction has meant for plant breeding. The IP 
regime change has both a positive and negative effect on the generation of knowledge. 
The positive effect is well known and easy to observe: research effort has increased due 
to the private sector’s involvement. The negative effect is not so obvious; we need to be 
aware of the special feature of knowledge as both an input and output. The two effects 
are then incorporated into a single analysis that views the overall impact of IPRs on 
R&D and offers inferences regarding the desirable IPR regime.  
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3.2. The nature of goods 
Each good possesses certain characteristics regarding its use. Economists have singled 
out two characteristics, excludability and rivalry, as being of particular significance for 
the manner in which goods are produced. 
Samuelson (1954) categorized goods according to whether they are rival or non-
rival. A rival good is one whose consumption by one person restricts the ability of others 
to consume that good (e.g., ice cream or shampoo). On the other hand, the use of non-
rival goods by one person does not reduce their use by someone else. Examples of non-
rival goods include swimming pools or knowledge of a technique in plant breeding.   
Musgrave (1959) further classified goods as being excludable or non excludable. 
Excludability refers to situations where consumers can be excluded from the 
consumption of a good without incurring substantial cost. An example is a car for sale; 
the ownership of the car by the seller excludes people from using it. Conversely, non-
excludable goods are those whose exclusion is either impossible or prohibitively costly 
and therefore everyone has the right to use them. For example, it would be very costly to 
try and restrict peoples’ use of the air that they breathe-this is a non-excludable good. 
Economists use rivalry and excludability as the defining characteristics of goods 
(see, for example, Romer, 1990). Applying these two criteria, the following four 
categories are derived. 
 
Table 3.1. Classification of goods. 
 
Source: Gray, Fulton and Furtan, 2007. 
 Excludable Non-excludable 
Rival Private goods Common pool goods 
Non-rival Toll goods Public goods 
 
Private goods are both excludable and rival. The fact that these goods are 
excludable means that private ownership may occur. Toll goods are non-rival and 
excludable. A toll highway is an example of a toll good. Drivers can be excluded from 
the highway while, at least until the point of congestion, the drivers’ use of the road does 
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not affect another’s use. Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable. Once they have 
been produced everyone can consume them and restricting other individuals from their 
use is costly. Traffic lights and signs are good examples of public goods. 
Finally, common pool goods are rival but non-excludable. The governance and 
the procurement of this category of goods appear to be the most problematic. The reason 
is that while everybody has access to them (i.e. they are non-excludable), their use by 
one person reduces the amount available to others (i.e. they are rival), motivating users 
to utilize the good as much as possible. This phenomenon is known as the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin, 1968), which, as it will be shown later, is strongly linked to the 
tragedy of the anticommons (Heller and Eisenberg, 1968; Buchanan and Yoon, 2000). 
The preceding classifications are incomplete since there are many goods that 
possess a mixture of these attributes on different levels. The above summary, however, 
is a useful rough guide for understanding how the nature of goods changes when one or 
both of the above characteristics changes.  
3.3. The nature of knowledge and its implications 
3.3.1. Changing the nature of knowledge 
The output in canola R&D, as in other R&D industries, is knowledge. In the absence of 
IP rights, knowledge is a non-excludable and non-rival good; once it is produced it is 
difficult to prevent others from using it and the use of this knowledge by no means 
reduces its availability to other scientists. Both characteristics pose problems in the 
production of the good by the private sector. Private firms supply goods and services, 
hoping that their disposition in the market will yield enough value to pay for the factors 
employed in their production. If the good or service can be consumed without any 
payment, private firms will make losses and eventually abandon their production. When 
the nature of the good renders profit unattainable, the market fails and other structures 
must be examined for the production of the good. 
As we have seen in chapter 2, until the mid 1980s, canola R&D was carried out 
almost exclusively by public institutions (Gray, Fulton and Furtan, 2001). When public 
funding became inadequate to cover the increasing need for investments in the 
biotechnology industry, and when the government wanted to reduce its expenditures, 
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private sector involvement was encouraged by the new opportunities offered by the 
development of biotechnology and the creation of IPRs. Biotechnology offered the tools 
with which the ownership of varieties could be determined. The assignment of IPRs and 
the creation of the legal means to penalize infringers made excludability possible. In 
plant breeding, the breeder of a variety with a new trait could avert its free use by 
patenting the genes responsible for the trait. In this way, scientific knowledge was 
transformed from a non-excludable good to an excludable good, while its non-rival 
characteristic was maintained. In the classification of goods context, R&D moved from 
being a public good to being a toll good. 
The transformation of scientific knowledge from non-excludable to an 
excludable good had an impact on the horizontal structure of the agricultural R&D 
industry. According to Romer (1990), the use of non-rival goods as inputs in the 
production process creates increasing returns to scale. The reason is that a non-rival 
input can be used multiple times in the production process without costing the firm 
anything additional (Fulton, 1997). Correspondingly, in R&D, technological 
advancement is a non-rival input whose repeated use in the production process lowers 
average cost (Fulton, 1997). In order to cover the cost of the technological advancement 
that creates increasing returns to scale, the R&D firm must price its output above 
marginal cost (Fulton, 1997). This pricing behaviour can only be carried out if the 
industry contains a small number of firms and is non-competitive (Fulton, 1997). 
Therefore, the transformation of knowledge to an excludable good that was 
enabled by the introduction of IPRs is a partial factor in the consolidation of the 
agrochemical, seed and biotech industries (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001). According to 
the World Development Report (WDR) 2008, in 1997 the market share for the four 
largest agrochemical and seed companies was 33% for agrochemicals and 23% for seeds 
while in 2004 the concentration ratio of the top four companies (CR4) increased to 60% 
and 33% respectively. With respect to biotechnology patents that were issued in the US, 
the CR4 was 38% in 2004 (WDR, 2008). Generally, it is believed that when an 
industry’s CR4 is greater than 40% the market competitiveness starts to decline (WDR, 
2008). The consolidation that is observed in the chemical and seed markets cannot be 
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attributed exclusively to the transformation of knowledge from a non-excludable to an 
excludable good, but is due to other factors as well, such as escalation strategies. 
 The presence of increasing returns to scale in the production process also causes 
the hold-up problem (Fulton, 1997). The hold-up problem appears when one party is 
reluctant to make an investment because of the fear of opportunistic behavior (Fulton, 
1997). This opportunistic behavior may take the form of an increase in the price of an 
input. The increase in price may be facilitated by the market power held by the few 
firms in the input market. For example, suppose there is an agrochemical company that 
plans to initiate R&D to discover a gene that is resistant to one of its chemical products. 
The insertion of that gene into a crop, e.g. canola, will render that crop resistant to the 
company’s chemical. The company’s plan is to purchase seed from a seed company, 
insert the gene into the seed and then sell to farmers both the chemical and the seed 
resistant to it, recouping the costs for R&D. However, if the seed industry is 
concentrated enough, once the investments for the gene have been made by the 
agrochemical company, seed companies will raise the price of the seed to extract the 
maximum possible rent from the agrochemical company. If the agrochemical company 
knows that seed companies will follow this strategy, it will choose not to invest in the 
new trait in the first place. In this way, research efforts may be forgone and research 
opportunities are lost. To avoid the hold-up problem, the agrochemical companies could 
decide to purchase the seed company. In other words, when IPRs create opportunities 
for exploitation, a possible remedy is the integration of upstream or downstream 
companies (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001). Therefore, vertical integration through 
mergers and acquisitions is another explanation of the agricultural industry’s observed 
consolidation.  
As many economists have recognized, knowledge plays a dual role – it is both an 
output and an input (Shapiro, 2001). The privatization of scientific knowledge has 
undoubtedly increased its output; at the same time, this privatization has created an array 
of proprietary technologies. A problem emerges when these proprietary technologies 
cannot be used as inputs for further research, perhaps because of factors such as high 
royalties or unwillingness to license. Restricted access to inputs (i.e. new technologies) 
is expected to result in reduced output. The following section explains how this happens 
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and shows why the dual role of knowledge becomes of utmost importance when R&D is 
carried out under IP protection.    
3.3.2. The pyramid framework 
Scientific research and technological development (namely R&D) involve the creation, 
usage and application of knowledge for the commercialization of material or immaterial 
products (Investor Words, 2007). The dual role of knowledge as an input and output in 
scientific research has permitted the gradual building of science as we experience it 
today. The history of science is full of examples where previous technological 
achievements were employed as the foundation of new ones. The dynamic character of 
this process can be pictured as the construction of a pyramid (Shapiro, 2001). In the 
same way that bricks are placed on top of others to create a pyramid, new knowledge is 
based on previous findings. This knowledge is in turn used by scientists to make new 
inventions. As long as there are no restrictions in using the previous building blocks, the 
pyramid will continue to grow. 
The introduction of property rights in the generation of knowledge may impede 
the above process. The owners of intellectual property can place a restriction on the use 
of their intellectual products or ask for a royalty. If the potential developer of a new 
technology is not granted access to key inputs or technologies, the assembly of the 
pyramid will be problematic. Some of its segments will never be realized or they will be 
developed with a time lag. The damage becomes more severe when the proprietary 
knowledge lies at the bottom of the structure, with the lack of access to enabling 
technologies blocking a wide range of technological breakthroughs. Thus, the 
assignment of intellectual property rights has the potential to affect both the shape of the 
pyramid and the time horizon of its composition.  
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 Figure 3.1. The Pyramid with Intellectual Property Protection. 
 
Figure 3.1 depicts the building of science. Each building block represents a 
technology, an invention or other types of knowledge. The higher rows of blocks 
represent newer technology while the lower blocks represent older and more 
fundamental knowledge. Building blocks of the same row are typically complement 
technologies; both building blocks are needed for the creation of the piece above them.  
Suppose that two of the building blocks are proprietary, IPP1 and IPP2; in the 
case of plant breeding they are technologies protected by patents or PBRs. Also, assume 
that the two technologies are owned by different owners. The ownership of the 
technologies gives owners the right to exclude third parties from their use. If the right is 
used, third parties will not be able to conduct R&D and to create the next building 
blocks and consequently all the subsequent ones, shown as being crossed out, will never 
be realized. The refusal of one of the owners to license/share the technology is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition to lead to this outcome. As we move towards the top 
of the pyramid, more access has to be obtained, as dependence from previous building 
blocks increases. Therefore, the existence of multiple proprietary building blocks may 
hinder the building of the pyramid, causing difficulties for future R&D.  
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3.3.3. Plant Breeding in the Pyramid framework 
Before fitting the plant breeding case into the pyramid framework, there is a need to 
distinguish between current and completed research materials. Current material refers to 
material under development or research projects that are on their way to being 
completed. Access to ongoing research is critical as it can broaden or improve a research 
project. Completed material refers to the outcome of completed research. Completed 
material can be further classified as proprietary or public. Proprietary material is 
protected by IPRs, for example PBRs and patents. Public material refers to publicly 
available sources; anyone can have access without cost (other than a citation). R&D 
organizations may choose not to protect their invention for various reasons: the 
invention may not be subject to patenting, the costs of filing may be too high relative to 
its value or the material may not be commercially exploitable. In addition, universities 
and public institutions may release to the public the results of their R&D.   
Plant breeding science is cumulative; therefore it is well suited to the pyramid 
metaphor. The building may take the form of a resistant gene transplanted in a high 
protein content seed yielding a new variety, or the combination of quality germplasm for 
varietal breeding of novel traits. New research tools like double haploids and tissue 
cultures speed up the breeding process reducing the time needed for the development of 
new varieties. Access to the three types of material, proprietary, public and current, is 
captured by the pyramid framework as well; the first two in an obvious way. Current 
material can also be represented by a building block upon which future research can be 
built. Current research plays a prominent role in R&D as in many cases its results are 
used in the innovation process. Lack of access to all three types of materials retards the 
advancement of science and the building of the pyramid.  
The preceding analysis shows how knowledge is created and that when 
knowledge becomes proprietary and blockage to intellectual property rights occurs, 
subsequent innovation remains unexploited. Privatization of knowledge is a reality 
today, but blockage to intellectual property rights may or may not happen depending on 
the owners’ incentives. The tragedy of the commons and anticommons examine the 
incentives of right owners to make use of their rights and the outcomes of this choice.  
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3.4. The tragedy of the commons and anticommons 
The conventional problem of the commons (Hardin, 1968) is well understood by 
economists (see the discussion in section 3.2). In this situation, there is a common 
resource whose rights of use are spread among multiple users. If the resource is scarce, 
usage by one user will have negative external effects on the rest of the uses because his 
or her use of the resource will reduce the amount available to others. The end result—
the depletion of the resource—is what is known as the tragedy of the commons.  
The common fisheries example is frequently used to describe the tragedy of the 
commons. Suppose there is a fishing lake where everybody has the right to fish as much 
quantity as he/she wants. If the total quantity fished is smaller than the population 
growth, the resource will be sustained. If, however, the total quantity fished is greater 
than the population growth, the resource will be driven to a low level (potentially zero). 
Which of the two conditions is more bound to happen? The tragedy of the commons 
framework suggests the latter and the reason lies in the incentives. There is both a 
benefit and a cost related to each caught fish. While the benefit is private in nature (the 
fish’s value is reaped by its catcher), the cost is public (the potential offspring from the 
fish would have been available for everyone). Therefore, each individual has a strong 
incentive (which is the full benefit) but a weak disincentive (a fraction of the cost) to 
fish. The end result is the over catching of fish and their eventual depletion1.  
The tragedy of the anticommons (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) can be viewed as 
the opposite problem.2 In the anticommons set-up, there are, in addition to rights of use, 
assigned rights of exclusion. The holder of such a right is able to prevent others from 
using the resource. When exclusion rights are assigned to multiple owners, and the 
rights are complementary (i.e. all rights must be acquired for access to be granted), each 
                                                 
 
 
1 The tragedy of the commons is based on the assumption that the individuals are self interested and they 
will not act to achieve their common interest (Olson, 1965).  However, recent theoretical and experimental 
work (e.g. see Runge, 1986) suggests the existence of multiple types of individuals, some more willing 
than others to initiate reciprocity to achieve the benefits of collective action (Ostrom, 2000). The 
formation of social norms such as reciprocity, trust and fairness may encourage collective action that will 
help managing common pool resources (Ostrom, 2000).  
2 Heller and Eisenberg (1998) have noted that anticommons property can best be understood as the mirror 
image of commons property. Buchanan and Yoon (2000) have further indicated that there is a symmetry 
between the commons and the anticommons problem. 
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owner can block the other owners from using the resource. The result is that it remains 
intact or only partly exploited. To better illustrate the tragedy of the anticommons, 
consider again the fisheries example. Suppose this time a number of people individually 
have been granted the right to exclude potential fishers. If one member of that group 
exercises his right to exclude everyone else from fishing, the fishing lake will remain 
unexploited. In other words, anybody wanting to fish will have to collect permissions 
from all right holders. This collection procedure ranges from being tedious to 
impossible. Furthermore, as the number of right holders increases, it becomes more 
complicated and costly to gather the required rights, increasing the value of the resource 
that remains unexploited (Buchanan and Yoon, 2000). Both parties, the right holders and 
the potential users reach a lose-lose solution as they have failed to coordinate their 
actions and come to some sort of an agreement that would allow them to take advantage 
of the resource. Of course, the fishing example is extreme. In reality only a portion of 
the resource is subject to exclusion rights.  
Research and development provides an important real-life example of a situation 
where the tragedy of the anticommons can occur. In this paradigm, the common 
resource is R&D and the exclusive rights take the form of patents or other forms of 
intellectual protection. Each patent holder can potentially exclude other firms or 
researchers from utilizing the protected technology. The potential for a tragedy of the 
anticommons arises when the technologies under protection are complementary, 
meaning that multiple technological pieces are needed for the realization of a new one. 
If the assemblance of the different IP pieces is impossible or prohibitively costly, the 
new technology will never be realized, leaving unexploited a part of the research 
domain. In research areas where freedom to operate exists or institutions find ways (e.g. 
patent pools, consortiums) to put together all necessary IP pieces, the tragedy of the 
anticommons is avoided. 
The tragedy of the anticommons may well be at work in plant breeding: patents 
and PBRs can potentially exclude breeders from using proprietary genes, germplasm 
and research tools, thus stifling research and putting barriers in place for subsequent 
innovation. Future innovation in some research areas may never be realized if the owner 
of the key technology is unwilling to license/share it, or if it is carried out at a slow pace. 
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The development of new varieties is a long run process (at least ten to fifteen years) and 
includes the use of different technologies in the form of improved research tools or 
newly identified genes. In many instances inaccessibility to one of these inputs is 
enough to cause the abandonment of the whole research project. 
In the tragedy of anticommons, the inefficient management of a resource is due 
to external disturbances caused by the exercising of rights. The external disturbances 
take the form of blocked access to the resource. The externalities are negative in the 
sense that they bear some cost to the recipient, either by reducing the good’s rents or 
preventing their capture. 
 So, how to exercise one’s rights without hampering those of other owners? 
Coase (1960) provided one answer to this enigma, suggesting that rights become 
subjects of property. In this way, rights are traded among the interested parties, thereby 
internalizing the negative externalities. Theoretically the licensing of property rights 
should eliminate the tragedy of anticommons. Indeed, patents can be licensed for a 
royalty, allowing the licensee to use the acquired technology to his advantage.  
However, this ideal situation presupposes that royalty fees are low enough to 
allow the innovating firm to capture some of the rents from the commercialization of the 
new technology. If the sum of the royalty fees the innovative firm is required to pay 
outmatch the future rents, the firm will not proceed to the innovation process. In other 
words, the total revenues accruing from the new technology must be equal or greater 
than the costs of its research plus the required royalty fees. This condition is difficult to 
be satisfied because (a) the decision for the size of the royalty fees is taken by 
independent institutions; and (b) the uncertain nature of profits.  
In the first case, each IP owner will try to maximize the revenue from royalty 
fees but at the same time total royalty fees must be low enough to satisfy the following 
condition: 
(1)  total revenues – total costs ≥  total royalty fees 
 
If the total revenues minus the costs are less than total royalty fees, the research will not 
be undertaken and all parties will lose. If the revenues minus the costs are greater than 
total royalty fees, it means that IP owners could ask for higher royalty fees. Rational and 
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informed owners would set the royalty fees low enough for (1) to hold in equality. In 
this case IP owners extract the maximum amount of rents from the innovative firm, 
which, nonetheless undertakes the research (the factors of production are still paid). The 
problem arises when multiple IP owners make decisions independently about the height 
of royalty fees. If IP owners do not cooperate, which is a realistic scenario, condition (1) 
may not hold. The competition among IP owners to capture the rents created by the 
gathering of the two technologies, will lead to overcharging the third firm. If each firm 
tries to obtain the lions’ share of the rents by setting its royalty fees high, the innovative 
firm will not undertake the research effort, resulting in an outcome similar to the fishery 
example. In both cases, the tragedy of the anticommons refers to the unused resource-the 
resources not used due to the inability to combine all the necessary property rights.   
The second reason that condition (1) may not hold is the uncertainty over the 
research output and the revenues that it can confer. While the licensing fees and the 
costs can be recognized, the revenues are speculative. This means that in condition (1), 
each party (the innovative firm and the IP owners) expects a different value for total 
revenues. Diverse expectations will result in different charges for royalty fees, ceteris 
paribus. For instance, if an IP owner expects high total revenues, he will overprice his 
patent. If the expected total revenues are low, the licensing fee will be adjusted 
accordingly. In the unfortunate case where the expected total revenues by the innovative 
firm are less than those of IP owners, the innovative effort will not be undertaken. 
The trade of new technologies may not occur for other reasons such as strategic 
behavior, the prospect for further development and patent races. Firms may strategically 
choose not to license to their competitors in order to drive them out of the market or to 
block entry to new firms (Yiannaka and Fulton, 2005). Some technologies have the 
potential for improvement, which is something that the innovator would like to take 
advantage of first. Lastly, competing firms may be engaged in a race for a patent (Loury 
1979, Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980), therefore any disclosure to the rival firm would 
make his own research effort more difficult. 
Another hurdle that hampers the trade of technologies is the so called “hold up” 
problem. Suppose R&D firms, in an effort to speed up the R&D process, exercise their 
research exemption and use foreign material in the plant breeding prior to acquiring IP 
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rights. This places the IP owner in a strong bargaining position and the R&D firm in a 
weak one since the latter has already invested in the research, and perhaps the 
development, of a new product. The technology owner can use this power to extract the 
maximum rent from the R&D firm. Knowing that its potential rent will be extracted in 
this way affects the R&D firm’s incentive to use the IP material in the first place. If the 
rent that is extracted is large enough, the R&D firm will not have sufficient revenue to 
cover the cost of its investment. Thus, it will decide not to undertake the investment in 
the first place. The result is a “hold-up” of the new technology that could otherwise have 
been developed. 
The hold up problem becomes even worse when there are multiple IP owners, 
each of whom owns a separate technological building block. If the technological pieces 
are complementary and the owners cannot cooperate, then each of them will have both 
the incentive and the bargaining power to overcharge the firm that has made investments 
to put all the IP pieces together. If this scenario were to occur, the R&D firm would 
abandon its efforts and not undertake the investment in the first place. The outcome of 
the hold-up problem is the forgoing of the research and the loss of its value for the 
society.  
As will be shown later in the thesis, R&D firms employ a number of strategies to 
obtain access to critical material. The presence of these strategies indicates that hold up 
is an issue that plant breeders have to deal with and that they are taking action to avoid 
being caught in a situation where they would lack bargaining power or be unable to use 
key technologies. Indeed, the interviews showed numerous instances where plant 
breeders were delayed because of the inability to secure a license.  
Another important parameter is the existence of transactions costs. The handling 
of rights presupposes multiple transactions, some being quite complex, among owners 
and interested parties. Licensing for example, presupposes a search by the patent holder, 
the successful completion of the negotiation process and the implementation of the 
agreed conditions. Such transactions are not costless and are less likely to happen 
between competitive parties. Moreover, many public institutions (e.g., universities) have 
limited resources to cope with transaction costs and limited ability to bargain with other 
players (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). In condition (1) explained above, transaction costs 
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would be part of the total costs; as transaction costs rise, the possibility increases that 
total royalty fees exceed total revenues minus total costs. In other words, transaction 
costs add to the possibility that trade will not occur in IP. 
There are other factors that can negatively influence transactions. For example, 
in the bargaining process over patent, researchers may be subject to cognitive biases 
(Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). According to Tversky and Kahneman (1991), the same 
difference between two options will be given greater weight if it is viewed as difference 
between two disadvantages than if it is viewed as a difference between two advantages 
(the so called loss aversion). For example, hockey fans are more enthusiastic when their 
team covers a handicap of -3 goals than when their team gets ahead +3 goals; they value 
the difference between two disadvantages (-3) more than the difference between two 
advantages (+3). In the same way, researchers/negotiators are less likely to reach an 
agreement when the attributes over which they bargain are framed as losses than when 
they are framed as gains (Bazerman and Carroll, 1987). This means that in the 
negotiation processes the concessions that one party makes (the losses) are evaluated 
more than the concessions offered by the other party (the gains). In transactions, that 
would mean that the involved parties show a smaller willingness to pay (WTP) and a 
higher willingness to accept (WTA) than their objective evaluations of the patent(s) at 
stake. Given that a transaction is carried out when WTP > WTA, cognitive biases 
decrease the feasible territory of transactions.   
To get around the above barriers to IP access, private firms conducting R&D 
have developed alternative practices. Some of them are attainable only through 
collaboration among R&D enterprises (e.g., non-disclosure agreements, cross-licensing, 
patent pools, consortiums), while other involve a certain amount of risk (e.g., infringing, 
inventing around). However, even these means have certain drawbacks associated with 
them. For example, patent pools and cross licenses are limited by antitrust law (Shapiro, 
2001). Furthermore, the formation of all the above structures presupposes negotiations 
and transactions, the cost of which is again burdening the budget of the involving 
parties. 
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As it is observed, transaction costs are present in most of the set-ups that try to 
deal with restricted access to proprietary knowledge. The next section deals with the 
transaction costs and their management. 
3.5. Transaction costs 
Under a classical analysis, economic agents are believed to undertake activities and 
decisions in a fully informed and rational manner. For example, in competitive markets, 
a buyer is supposed to be aware of all possible ranges of prices offered by different 
firms (known as “perfect knowledge”) and rational enough to choose the most desirable 
option. It assumes that consumers are knowledgeable enough to trace different trade 
opportunities, pick the one to which both parties agree, and avoid those agents who fail 
to observe the rules of the trade. This kind of clarity and information, however, is either 
unattainable3 or costly (in terms of money and time). Hence, transactions, the 
performance of which is indissolubly linked with knowledge of the market, contain what 
are known as “transaction costs.”  
Three kinds of transaction costs have been recognized: search costs (related to 
detecting individuals suitable for the transaction); negotiation costs (for coming to an 
arrangement under agreeable terms); and enforcement costs (those associated with 
supervising the observance of agreed upon rules) (Dahlman, 1979). All three costs 
emanate from insufficient information. Search costs arise because of limited information 
regarding candidate agents for a transaction. Negotiation and enforcement costs could be 
prevented or limited if there was adequate information about willingness to trade and 
maintain agreed upon conditions (Dahlman, 1979).  
The identification of transaction costs and exploration of their attributes is 
essential in recognizing their appearance and importance in the markets. In R&D 
industries, transaction costs play a major role in the flow of proprietary knowledge. 
                                                 
 
 
3 The literature regarding an individual’s limits in absorbing and retaining information refers to this as 
“bounded rationality” (Simon, 1995). Bounded rationality constrains individuals from adapting the 
optimum amount of information because the full range of possibilities is unknown (Simon, 1991). When 
an individual is confronted with excessive information, he/she will select that which best aligns with past 
experiences or knowledge base (Lang, 2006). 
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Given that knowledge is an input for these industries, transaction costs become a key 
aspect in understanding why knowledge may not be accessed when privatized. 
3.6. Determining the optimum level of control: Incentives and Disincentives to 
R&D 
So far, it has been shown that IPR legislation affects overall research activity in two 
opposing ways. On the positive side, IPRs help recoup research costs, thus providing 
incentives to innovators. On the negative side, as protective measures become more 
rigorous, further innovation that uses the protected technology is deterred due to the 
tragedy of the anticommons effect. These positive and negative impacts can be 
considered as incentives and disincentives for further research. Given the incentives and 
disincentives to R&D, the overall impact of IPRs on R&D can be examined. The 
exploration of these two impacts allows for inferences to be made regarding the level of 
IPR that maximizes net R&D output. These inferences can then be used in policy 
making, particularly policies that target the maximization of net R&D output.  
The likely incentive relationship between IPRs and R&D is suggested by the 
work of Akerlof et al. (2003). Akerlof et al. (2003) argue that stronger copyrights do not 
always endow inventors with substantially greater incentives to innovate. According to 
their calculations, the additional incentive from the extension of copyright in new works 
is much less than one percent. This suggests that, at least in the case of copyright, there 
is a critical point after which additional strengthening of IPRs (extension of copyrights 
in Akerlof et al.’s case) induces a very small amount of new works. With this 
background, the relationship between IPR strength and IPR induced R&D can be 
expected to have the form drawn in figure 3.2. 
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 IPR Strength 
  R&D 
S1 
Figure 3.2. Incentives from IPRs. 
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates that an increase in the strength of IPRs leads to an increase 
in R&D activity, albeit at a reduced rate. Thus, as IPRs become stronger the impact in 
R&D activity becomes less and less. As in most other activities, there is diminishing 
marginal return to increased IPR strength. IPR strength S1 is the point after which 
additional strengthening of IPRs (e.g., a term extension or a widening of scope) 
increases R&D at a diminishing rate. For IPR strength less than S1, it is expected that 
diminishing returns have not yet set in. The exact shape of the curve prior to S1 is of 
minor importance because society will never wish to operate in this region – society will 
always choose an IPR strength at least as large as S1.  
 To determine the level of IPRs that maximizes R&D activity, the shapes of the 
curves showing both the incentives and the disincentives to R&D are required. In 
contrast to the incentive curve, the disincentive curve is expected to rise at an increasing 
rate. Enhanced IPRs make the effort and costs of patenting worthwhile, even for 
research tools whose current value is not so high but whose future value may be large. 
The generation of patents in the pyramid framework would mean that more building 
blocks would be owned by IP owners. As the number of proprietary building blocks 
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increases, the likelihood of blockage increases. Likewise, as the number of patents rises, 
the tragedy of the anticommons is expected to occur more often and become more 
severe. So, as it is shown in figure 3.3, the disincentives of IPRs are expected to rise at 
an increasing rate.   
 
  R&D 
IPR strength 
Figure 3.3. Disincentives from IPRs. 
  
Once the shape of the incentive and the disincentive curves have been 
determined, IPRs’ overall impact on R&D can be examined by incorporating both 
curves into a single analysis. The exact form and position of the incentive and the 
disincentive firms are unknown; therefore two broad cases can be distinguished, the 
interior and the corner solution. In both cases it is assumed that the negative impact of 
IPRs on R&D is always less than the corresponding positive impact, so that there is a net 
benefit to having some degree of IPRs. Diagrammatically, the presence of net benefits to 
IPRs means that the disincentives curve always lies under the incentives curve. 
3.6.1.   Interior Solution 
The objective is to find the level of IPR strength that maximizes the net gain in R&D 
output. The net gain in terms of R&D is determined by the vertical difference between 
the incentives curve and the disincentives curve. The net gains in R&D are maximized at 
the IPR strength where the slope of the incentives curve equals the slope of the 
disincentives curve. The slope of the two curves at a point is given by their tangents at 
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that point. In figure 3.4 this occurs at point S* where the two tangents, curves I and II, 
are parallel. 
 
IPR Strength 
R&D 
Incentives 
Disincentives 
Net gain 
in R&D 
S* 
Y1 
Y2 
Curve I 
Curve II 
Figure 3.4. Maximum R&D output. 
 
3.6.2.   Corner Solutions 
In the analysis shown in Figure 3.4, S* lies between the two possible extreme situations: 
one where there are no IPRs and the other where IPRs are at their maximum strength. In 
figure 3.5 these levels are marked as Smin and Smax, respectively. Smin refers to a 
situation where IPRs are completely absent; anyone can use anyone else’s intellectual 
products without paying a price for them. This environment bears many similarities to 
the canola industry prior to the 1980s where intellectual products could not be 
technically identified and protected. At Smin, both the incentives and the disincentives 
are expected to be minimal; the incentives are low because of the free rider problem and 
the disincentives are low because no permissions need to be acquired. At the other 
extreme, Smax is a regime with very powerful intellectual property rights both in terms 
of patent duration (e.g. infinite number of years) and patent scope. Strong IPRs endow 
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R&D firms that own or have access to key technologies with substantial negotiation 
power. 
   
 
R&D 
IPR Strength   Smax Smin 
Incentives 
Disincentives 
Figure 3.5. Conditions in which maximum IPR strength is optimum. 
  
The corner solution examines the conditions under which the optimum value of 
the control variable, in our case IPR strength, coincides with the maximum or minimum 
value of this variable.  
In figure 3.5 the incentive and the disincentive curves are drawn so that at 
maximum IPR strength (Smax) the slope of the incentive curve is larger than that of the 
disincentive curve. In this case, the vertical distance between the incentive and the 
disincentive curves is maximized at Smax. In contrast to the interior solution where the 
optimum IPR strength requires a modest/balanced IPR strength, in this corner solution 
the optimum for society in terms of R&D output is to extend patents as much as possible 
e.g. by increasing patent duration for a large number of years. Therefore, even though 
the tragedy of the anticommons is at work (as IPR strength increases, the disincentives 
for R&D increase) maximum IPR strength is nevertheless the optimum solution in 
maximizing net R&D gains. This is so because while increasing IPR strength has a 
 39
negative effect on R&D, the positive effect on R&D is even larger. The marginal gains 
in R&D from IPRs outweigh the marginal losses caused by the tragedy of the 
anticommons effect, rendering additional IPR extension desirable. 
The case where the net gains in R&D are maximized at the minimum IPR 
strength is also possible. This scenario emerges when at Smin the slope of the 
disincentive curve is larger than that of the incentive curve (this case is not illustrated). 
If at Smin the marginal benefit from increasing IPR strength is less than the marginal 
cost, then the net gains in R&D are maximized at this point. 
 From the above it is evident that the relative magnitudes of the positive and 
negative effects play a crucial role in determining the appropriate level of R&D strength. 
As well, even though the tragedy of the anticommons is at work, further IPR extension 
may still be beneficial in some cases. 
3.7. Summary 
The alteration of knowledge from a non-excludable good to an excludable good that was 
enabled by advances in biotechnology and IPR legislation in Canada has changed 
knowledge’s availability to the research community. Given that advancement in science 
requires the use of knowledge generated by multiple and different research entities, the 
assignment of IPRs may encumber research enhancement. IPRs have made knowledge 
proprietary, endowing owners with the right to exclude possible users. The prospect of 
blockage becomes more likely when permission from multiple owners is required for the 
creation of a new technology. When cooperation among IP owners is impossible, each 
owner has an incentive to overcharge the prospective licensor. The end result can be the 
abandonment of the research effort. 
 The tragedy of the anticommons theory identifies a way in which IPRs may 
discourage further research. When both the incentives and the incentives resulting from 
IPRs are incorporated into the analysis, valuable inferences can be made regarding the 
desirable IPR regime. As the interior and corner solutions indicate, the optimum IPR 
strength critically depends on the position and shape of the incentive and the 
disincentive curves.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
Data for this thesis was collected by in-person interviews. During the interview, 
respondents were asked short closed-ended questions and broader open-ended questions. 
The key for a successful empirical study is the presence of several safeguards that 
enhance the consistency of the data collected and that eliminate subjective elements in 
the analysis. The discussion of the survey is followed by a brief description of the 
database set up and the implementation of the interview processes. This chapter 
concludes with additional information on the selection process for the interviewees and 
the participation rate.   
4.2. Survey research 
Survey research is a fundamental tool for measurement in applied social research. 
Survey research includes any measurement procedures that involve asking questions of 
respondents (Trochim, 2006). Surveys can be divided in two categories: the 
questionnaire and the interview. Each of these methods has several types according to 
their implementation. For instance, interviews may be personal or conducted by 
telephone. Likewise, there are group administered questionnaires, household drop-off 
surveys and mail surveys (Trochim, 2006). Each of these types has some advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, personal interviews allow for direct contact with the 
respondent but they are time consuming. For the purpose of this thesis, personal 
interviews were used. During the interviews, the respondents were asked very specific 
questions from which quantitative data could be obtained. Qualitative data were also 
collected when the respondent elaborated on the specific questions and when they 
addressed the more open-ended questions. The combination of both qualitative and 
quantitative data allowed for data collection that would not be able to capture by using 
only one of the two methods.
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4.3. Quality characteristics of an empirical study 
The quality of any empirical social research is commonly checked on four bases: 
construct validity; internal validity; external validity; and reliability. Construct validity 
seeks agreement between a theoretical concept and a specific measuring device or 
procedure (Trochim, 2006). Construct validity is increased through the use of multiple 
sources of evidence (e.g., documentation, interviews, archival records), the 
establishment of a chain of evidence, and feedback on the draft from key informants 
(Yin, 2003, p. 36). This thesis uses diverse inputs such as interviews, published 
documents, theses, and survey data in an effort to ensure construct validity. 
Internal validity refers to an investigator’s ability to make inferences based on 
interview and documentary evidence collected as part of the research (Yin, 2003). 
Pattern matching, explanation building, addressing rival explanations, and using logic 
models are techniques for ensuring internal validity. Pattern matching logic compares an 
empirically based pattern with a predicted one, while explanation building, a special 
type of pattern building, aims at analyzing data by building an explanation about the 
case (Trochim, 1989, p. 120). Logic models are another form of pattern matching. Their 
distinguishing feature is that they stipulate a complex chain of events over time 
(Trochim, 1989, p. 127). Finally, rival explanations in empirical studies must be exposed 
and further evidence examined that either supports or disproves the original hypothesis. 
External validity involves the extent to which the results of a study can be 
generalized beyond the sample (Bracht and Glass, 1968). In other words, it indicates 
whether the results of the study can be applied to other people (population validity) or 
settings (ecological validity) (Bracht and Glass, 1968). There are two threats to external 
validity, population validity and ecological validity. Population Validity refers to the 
extent to which the results of a study can be generalized from the specific sample that 
was studied to a larger group of subjects, while Ecological Validity the extent to which 
the results of an experiment can be generalized from the set of environmental conditions 
created by the researcher to other environmental conditions (Bracht and Glass, 1968). 
Reliability is the consistency of the measurement, or the degree to which an 
instrument measures the same way each time it is used under the same condition with 
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the same subjects (Gall et al., 1996). In other words it is the repeatability of your 
measurement. A measure is considered reliable if a person's score on the same test given 
twice is similar (Gall et al., 1996). 
4.4. Survey database 
Interviews were the principal source of data for building a formal database. Participants 
were either scientists involved in canola breeding or IP officers. As a result, not every 
interview followed the same set of questions. IP officers mainly offered data related to 
the cost of IP services, while canola breeders provided data on IP protection of their 
research outcomes. The data were aggregated and organized into two electronic files—a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet containing the answers and their frequencies, and a 
Microsoft Word document, which divided responses into coding themes such as secrecy, 
licensing, collaboration, and sharing. Accords, arguments, and quotes were arranged 
either in support or in opposition to each theme. The spreadsheet was used to make 
tables and plot graphs, while the Word document served as the basis for the qualitative 
analysis. 
4.5. Canola interviews 
A key source of information for the thesis is the interviews with canola breeders and 
others involved in canola breeding. The interviews had a dual purpose: (1) to collect 
data concerning canola breeding and intellectual property protection that could be used 
for current and future research; and (2) to provide canola scientists an opportunity to 
express possible concerns and personal views regarding the current IP regime and its 
impact (if any) on their individual research effort and on canola research and 
development in general. The questions were carefully constructed to avoid possible 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations by interviewees.4 When necessary, questions 
were followed by definitions of crucial terms (e.g., research tool), terms with multiple or 
                                                 
 
 
44 The contribution of C.J. Pozniak, professor in the Crop Development Centre, University of 
Saskatchewan, and wheat breeder, was invaluable in pre-testing the questionnaire and selecting the 
technical terms in the wording of the questions.  
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wide interpretations (e.g., secrecy), or economic terms (e.g., transaction costs). Further 
clarifications were provided during the interview process.  
The questionnaire was designed to elicit data and information closely related to 
the subject under study, but without requiring participants to reveal proprietary 
information. For example, scientists were asked to describe any research tools that they 
had invented, but the aim was a general reference to the kinds of tools used (e.g., 
markers, gene sequences) rather than a technical description of the invention. This was 
intended to put interviewees at ease.  
Prior to conducting the interviews, approval was secured from the University of 
Saskatchewan’s Behavioural Ethics Committee. Approval of the study’s procedures for 
data collection, storage, and use, as well as guidelines for respecting interviewees’ 
anonymity, was granted on September 20, 2006.  
4.5.1. Interview process 
All potential interviewees were initially contacted via e-mail. This gave the researcher 
an opportunity to introduce himself, briefly present interviewees with the purpose and 
scope of the research, and then explain the importance of their participation to the 
project. Once interviewees expressed their willingness to take part, a mutually 
convenient date for conducting an interview was established. The questionnaire (see 
Appendix A), the interview consent form, and, in most cases, the interview transcript 
release form were sent two to three days prior to the appointment. Permitting potential 
interviewees an opportunity to take a look at the questionnaire before the interview 
allowed them to make an informed decision as to whether they desired to participate. It 
also provided them with a sense of context and helped them better understand the 
information being sought. Such advance familiarization made the discussion more fluid 
and focused on issues relevant to the research. The consent form was included to 
elaborate more on the purpose of the interviews, the procedure, and the potential 
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benefits and risks, as well as confidentiality issues. Recognizing the sensitivity of some 
questions, interviewees were encouraged to express any concerns about the above.5 
Most interviews lasted between forty-five and sixty minutes, and all but one 
were audio recorded (due to technical difficulties with the recorder one interview was 
not recorded). For the one interview that was not recorded, the data from the 
questionnaire were included in the formal database with the interviewee’s consent. 
However, the qualitative data from the interview could not be used. Transcription 
generally took seven to eight hours per interview. Some were transcribed twice or more 
to obtain the highest possible degree of accuracy. Transcripts were then forwarded by e-
mail to the interviewees for revision, correction, and clarification. Interviewees were 
encouraged to change an answer, clarify arguments, or provide further explanations 
wherever necessary. Edited transcripts were returned along with a signed Interview 
Transcript Release Form (Appendix C). 
The Interview Transcript Release Form offered a range of confidentiality status 
options for interviewees. In all but one cases, the interviewees chose to remain 
anonymous. Hence, in the analysis section they are referred to as “breeders”, 
“researchers”, “scientists” etc. Whenever applicable, responses are attributed to a group 
of people, such as “a number of breeders recognized that …” or “some scientists alleged 
….”. All interviewees have been assigned two numbers. When a quote from an 
interview is used to support or reject an argument, it is referenced by one of the two 
numbers that have been assigned to him. In doing so, the possibility that an interviewee 
may be recognized by his/her quotes is minimized. The preservation of participants’ 
anonymity was crucial, for it allowed them to express freely their personal views and 
thoughts even as they revealed sensitive information. 
4.5.2. Selection of potential interviewees 
In a search for the most appropriate interviewees to provide information relative to the 
research question, two factors were taken into account: the potential interviewee’s 
                                                 
 
 
5 For example, in question 29, interviewees were asked to reveal the percentage of cases in which they 
used patented material without a license. Question 30 asked for incidents where they developed a new 
research tool/variety without first obtaining freedom-to-operate. 
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involvement in either canola breeding6 or intellectual protection management.7 A list of 
forty names was compiled, mainly by reviewing potential interviewees’ research 
interests and their research profile according to their institution’s website. The choice of 
institutions was based on their involvement in canola research and development. 
Particular weight was given to obtain a significant representation from both the public 
and the private sectors. Consultation with Dr. Murray Fulton (thesis supervisor) 
narrowed the list to approximately twenty-five potential interviewees. Final selection 
was based on Dr. Fulton’s insight into potential interviewees’ experience in canola 
breeding. Dr. Wilf Keller (thesis committee member) was also invited to review the list 
and propose additions or deletions. Dr. Keller has been actively involved in the 
development and application of biotechnologies for the genetic modification of crops, 
particularly canola. He has collaborated with numerous government, university, and 
industry groups, and has provided training for researchers in plant biotechnology. Thus, 
his experience and knowledge of the canola research community were valuable inputs 
for the formation of the list. Taking into account these suggestions, the final list 
consisted of twenty-two potential participants—seventeen involved in canola breeding 
and five in IP management. Only the thesis advisor and the researcher know which 
individuals were eventually interviewed. 
4.5.3. Participation rate 
Thirteen personal interviews were carried out with canola breeders, developers of 
research tools, and IP officers (Dr. Fulton participated in six of them). The acceptance 
rate of interview requests was sixty-eight percent. Three potential interviewees were not 
contacted due to a lack of up-to-date contact information. Of the remaining nineteen 
interviewees, three declined immediately, three felt it inappropriate to participate, and 
thirteen accepted and completed the interviews. From those completing the interviews, 
                                                 
 
 
6 For the purposes of this thesis, the scientists involved in plant breeding can be divided in two categories: 
breeders and non-breeders. The former develop new canola varieties, while the latter produce tools 
(markers, vectors) used in canola breeding. In the search for interviewees, both types of scientists were 
sought.  
7 Of particular interest were officers managing IP protection on new plant varieties. Their inclusion in the 
sample was fortunate as they filled in different parts of the picture. 
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12 agreed to have the transcripts released in the thesis. One interviewee refused to sign 
the interview transcript release form and therefore the qualitative-quantitative data from 
this person were not included.  
The applicability of the questions varied and resulted in different answer rates 
for some questions. For example, IP officers responded only to part five (related to the 
costs and benefits of stronger IP) of the questionnaire and to the follow-up questions. 
Likewise, scientists not developing canola varieties skipped questions related to that 
topic.
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CHAPTER 5: DATA PRESENTATION 
5.1. Introduction 
It is well established that strong intellectual property rights increase R&D and 
innovative activity. As Chapter 2 has shown, this has certainly been the experience in 
the canola industry. As the previous chapter showed, however, there is also an argument 
that stronger IPRs may restrict further R&D. The purpose of this chapter is to use data 
collected from interviews with canola breeders to examine the impact that IP protection 
is having on R&D activity in this sector.  
The chapter starts off by recognizing a key characteristic of contemporary R&D: 
the elevation of intellectual property protection activity. The increased IP protection is 
then argued to block breeders’ access to public, current and proprietary material. The 
following sections provide evidence that this is happening in the canola industry. The 
analysis in this chapter is based on 12 interviews, 8 with canola researchers and 4 with 
IP officers. The interviews with the canola breeders provided qualitative and 
quantitative data while the interviews with IP officers provided qualitative data only.      
5.2. Profile of canola breeders/researchers 
Table 5.1 presents data on the number of years the respondents have been involved in 
canola breeding. The eight canola breeders that were interviewed have been involved in 
canola breeding for a considerable amount of time, the minimum being 10 years and the 
maximum being 34 years. Some of them have also been involved in the breeding of 
other plants (e.g., wheat, flax) at one point in their career. The significant experience of 
the respondents means that they are familiar with IP issues in the industry. Indeed, some 
scientists have been involved with breeding long enough to experience the transition 
from a regime with no IP protection to one with strong IP safeguards. 
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Table 5.1. Number of years the respondents were involved in canola breeding. 
Number of years Frequency Percent 
1-4 0 0 
5-8 0 0 
9-12 3 37.5 
13-16 2 25 
17-20 2 25 
21+ 1 12.5 
Source: Interviews by the author. 
 
The respondents also have significant experience with research. Table 5.2 shows 
that 62.5% of the respondents have been in charge of more than five projects over the 
last 5 years, while on average 6.5 projects have been initiated by each researcher. No 
single definition of project was used. Instead, respondents were asked to determine what 
they thought constituted a project.  
 
 Table 5.2. Projects undertaken by interviewees in the past five years. 
 Number of projects Frequency Percent 
 0 0 0 
 1-5 3 37.5 
 6-10 4 50 
 11+ 1 12.5 
 
 Source: Interviews by the author.
 
Canola breeding is conducted using traditional breeding methods or 
biotechnology methods (or both). The majority of the canola breeders that were 
interviewed (6 out of 8) are involved in biotech research; two were involved only in 
traditional plant breeding (see Table 5.3).    
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Table 5.3. Projects undertaken by interviewees in the past five years. 
Research Type Frequency Percent 
Traditional 2 25 
Biotech 2 25 
Both 4 50 
Source: Interviews by the author. 
 
With regards to the kind of research canola breeders are engaged in, three types 
can be recognized: basic; applied; and development. As table 5.4 shows, most of the 
research projects are directed towards applied research and development (i.e. the 
development of varieties, germplasm, field research, commercial development etc).  
 
Table 5.4. Interviewee’s funding according to type of research 
 Frequencies 
% funding Basic Applied Development 
0-10 4 0 4 
11-20 1 2 0 
21-30 0 1 0 
31-40 1 1 0 
41-50 2 1 0 
51-60 1 1 2 
61-70 0 0 0 
71-80 0 0 2 
81-90 0 0 0 
91-100 0 1 0 
Source: Interviews by the author 
5.3. Increased Protection 
One of the defining features of research in the last ten years is the increasing rate of IP 
protection activity. Respondents indicated that 85% of the new varieties on average are 
protected by PBRs in their institution. Eighty percent of respondents indicated that use 
of PBRs has increased over the last five years. Interviewees were also asked if they had 
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increased their patenting of research tools over the last 5-10 years. Five out of seven 
(70%) indicated that they had. Those who answered affirmatively were further asked to 
indicate the reason for increasing their patenting. The increase in patenting was 57% “in 
response to the patenting of others to ensure freedom to operate” and 43% “to ensure 
that R&D expenditures are recouped.” Figure 5.1 provides a breakdown of the reasons 
given for increased protection activity.  
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Figure 5.1. Why patenting activity has increased. 
Source: Interviews by the author. 
 
5.4. Lack of access to public material 
Prior the proliferation of IPRs, scientists used publishing to ensure freedom to operate. 
Other breeders could also use the results in their research projects, providing they cited 
the author. According to the respondents, IPR legislation has rendered publishing a 
second best solution, as can been seen by the following quotes: 
 
Interviewee 3: “They want to patent first and then publish…we have been able to 
present posters and papers but we had to do the patent[ing] first.” 
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 Interviewee 9: “We have thought about it [publishing], but I can’t say we have done it. 
We have discussed that…but as long as we have something patentable we will try to 
patent to make sure that we will have freedom to operate and that we have something to 
trade.” 
 
Interviewee 2: “That [publication] is what I would do in cases where there wouldn’t be 
the possibility to protect IP but if we feel it should be in the public domain we would 
publish.” 
 
One of the reasons why patenting is preferred to publishing is that publishing 
does not always prevent firms from patenting published material. Interviewee 4 
explains:  
 
“I think the perception is that it [publishing] does give you protection for being able to 
practice the research, but it doesn’t. I think that is a misconception…the patent system is 
based on commercial utility. Scientific publications in many instances don’t allow or 
support commercial utility being described in a scientific paper. In fact, some companies 
may look through published data and file a patent on the information if it could have 
commercial value to or impact on the company. Even though they may not have done all 
the experiments. As long as a company can reduce it to commercial practice and it is 
novel etc., it can do that.”    
 
The inconsistencies from the Patent Office regarding the application of rules is 
another factor that renders publications an insecure mean of achieving freedom to 
operate, granting patents an advantage over publications. As interviewee 21 describes:  
 
“…the examiners in the patent offices are not consistent in how they apply the rules, 
resulting in [it] being difficult to make filing decisions. Therefore, while you may feel 
that you don’t have to file a patent because there is sufficient information in a 
publication to prevent someone else obtaining a patent on it, the contradictories and 
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inconsistencies in the patent office make it risky to not file on your own research, 
particularly if you want to have the freedom to practice your own technology.” 
 
Researcher: “Does this mean that other companies patent published results?”    
 
Interviewee 4: “Yes, and it has been done. There are lots of examples.”  
 
An example where publishing didn’t work was provided by another interviewee: 
 
Interviewee 10: “We have one example where we essentially tried to publish on yellow 
seed but there were two companies who patented on yellow seed even though we had 
massive amounts of public disclosure.” 
 
From the preceding analysis, it is emerging that patenting is more preferable than 
publishing. This would mean that as institutions turn to patenting to ensure freedom to 
operate and to reap the fruits of excludability, enriching the public domain with new 
knowledge becomes less important. As a result, the public pool of knowledge, from 
which every R&D organization draws knowledge, may be shrinking. Indication of such 
a scenario is found in the interviewees’ quotes:  
 
“But almost everybody in our industry can see the fact that the freely publicly available 
material for release without any burdens has dried out. So we are really locked in a point 
where 1995, 1998, 2000 was the last time where you could freely access material 
germplasm and that changes. So anyone that has not access to that material is, in long 
term, going to find it pretty difficult.” (Interviewee 1) 
 
 “…We will come to a point where knowledge, germplasm that is available from here 
will be exhausted to the extent that companies have more.” (Interviewee 23) 
 
“One of the difficulties with having the private sector doing research to improve their 
product is that they seldom publish what they discovered. This is an impediment in 
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many areas. I think of work done on the environmental aspect of transgenics where I 
know that companies have done a lot of good work but you will never see it published. 
But knowledge really should be shared so that everybody is better informed and be able 
to built on that knowledge and know the pitfalls and things to avoid.” (Interviewee 7) 
To provide further information on the extent to which research results are 
publicly available, interviewees were asked “What proportion of research tools you have 
developed goes to the public domain?” On average, responses indicated that only 22.5% 
of research tools are available to the public. The percentage is quite low if we take into 
account that the majority of interviewees (five out of eight) work for public institutions. 
5.5. Access to proprietary tools 
5.5.1. Access to key technologies 
To determine to what extent scientists have access to essential research tools that are 
owned by others, interviewees were asked to indicate whether there had been any case 
where they could not get a research tool or germplasm and decided to cease the project. 
Sixty two percent answered affirmatively. Those who experienced blockage were further 
asked to reveal the reason(s) for not being able to get the necessary research tool. 
Almost half of them stated that the owner of the tool was unwilling to share it and one 
quarter said the negotiating parties had conflicting agendas and could not reach an 
agreement with all the rights holders. Other reasons include negotiations break down, 
high royalties and incomplete transactions (i.e. the agreement was never fulfilled). 
Figure 5.2 provides a breakdown of the reasons to for blocked access to research tools. 
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Figure 5.2. Why access to research tools is blocked. 
Source: Interviews by the author. 
 
5.5.2. Transaction Costs 
In the previous chapter we saw that transactions are not costless and that various types 
of transaction costs exist. Transactions of IPRs are no exceptions. The contracting 
parties, in our case R&D organizations, have to put formal arrangements in place that 
regulate the conditions under which licensing will take place. Such arrangements often 
involve negotiations between the licensee and the licensor and the compilation of legal 
documents that will reflect, in a formal way, the obligations and rights of each party. 
These tasks are usually undertaken by lawyers, IP officers and negotiators. When the 
volume of IP increases, the costs related to the management of IP are expected to rise.  
In examining whether transaction costs have increased over the last 5 years, 
interviewees were asked to indicate if the number of persons involved in the IP 
management in their organization had increased. If there had been an increase, breeders 
were asked to reveal the number of persons involved in managing IP five years ago and 
today. Five out of eight breeders indicated that an increase in the number of people 
dealing with IPs had occurred while three said that the number has remained steady. 
Two people on average were involved in IP management 5 years ago according to 
interviewees. Nowadays the average has tripled (6 people). However, the majority of 
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breeders, in response to the question if they require more IP related services (e.g., 
lawyers, IP officers, negotiators) compared to five years ago, responded that they do not. 
More specifically, only three out of eight indicated that they need more IP related 
services. 
The increase in the number of persons involved in IP management at the 
organizational level in combination with a need for more IP services compared to the 
past suggests that, during the last 5 years, there has been an increase in the volume of IP 
which called for more IP related personnel. R&D organizations have extended and better 
organized their IP departments to respond to the increasing IP volume. As interviewee 
14 stated “…we have very strong in-house legal team and we have a well defined 
process, so, for example, if there is something valuable I feel I want to document, [I] get 
[an] e-mail off and someone evaluates it quickly.” Another interviewee (5) shares a 
similar view: “Our IP department has grown substantially and is now somewhat more 
streamlined”.  
With regard to the time devoted to IP management by the breeders, one and a 
half more days per month on average are needed to handle IP compared to five years 
ago. In one case, however, the time spent on IP is three days less per month. The reason 
is that in the past, due to insufficient experts on IPRs, some breeders were assigned IP 
duties in addition to their research duties. The result was a loss of research activity. As 
interviewee 8 pointed out “…it can be incredibly distractive from research if you have to 
write patents”. However, this situation has started to change. As IP offices were 
becoming more organized, IP responsibilities were passed on to people trained to deal 
with IP issues. This freed some breeders from the burden of paperwork and bureaucracy. 
An example is given by interviewee 17: “I have some background in negotiating 
agreements and I even have some background in writing them, and I was really quite 
prominent in doing that for the first four years…but after that we had a large number of 
reorganizations and the business office has separated much further from the researchers, 
so for me the amount of time managing those kind of things is less, I think that is very 
typical”.  
One component of transaction costs is search costs. In canola research, search 
costs include the time spent to trace patents on particular research tools or genes. 
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Breeders want to make sure that their invention doesn’t infringe on someone else’s 
patent in fear of the “hold-up” problem (Shapiro, 2000). The hold-up problem refers to 
situations where “each party to a contract worries about being forced to accept 
disadvantageous terms later, after it has sunk an investment, or worries that it’s 
investment may be devalued by actions of others…” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, 
pp136) To avoid the hold-up problem breeders and/or IP officers have to watch for 
possible patents. This may imply the acquisition of certain software or data bases that 
help track the patents. It also involves work, possibly from hired lawyers or consultants, 
in identifying the scope of the patent and determining its level of threat to the current 
invention. To examine to what extent breeders check IP access (either by themselves or 
via their organization’s IP office), they were asked to state the percentage of cases where 
they look into research tools access. Seventy percent answered that they always look 
into IP access when they use a research tool. Fifteen percent (1 breeder) checks access in 
50% of the cases and the other fifteen in 80% of the cases. These answers clearly 
indicate that freedom to operate is a concern for the scientists.  
Another type of costs necessary for a transaction to take place is negotiation 
costs. The licensor and the licensee will have to agree first on the conditions of licensing 
before the transaction takes place. The breeders were asked to state the frequency of 
negotiations’ occurrence in their research projects. More specifically, “For the two most 
important projects/programs you are working on, how many pieces of IP did you have to 
negotiate?” The majority of the breeders (five out of eight) answered “none”, while 
three of them reported at least one case where they had to negotiate. Negotiation costs 
are not confined to the money value required for their accomplishment; they also 
involve time loss and failures in bargaining due to non-economic reasons such as 
cognitive biases (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). The following quotes illustrate the costs 
associated with negotiations: 
 
“You end up dealing with an additional layer of people who are doing the negotiating 
and they may not understand or not fully appreciate the implications of not reaching an 
agreement. The time factor here is substantial; it takes forever to get the two parties to 
come to some sort of an agreement. Both sides have lawyers and they rarely agree on 
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wording. Usually what they are trying to protect is not worth the cost of the 
negotiations.” (Interviewee 7) 
 
“…I think it is much better keeping the business office out of the picture until you 
actually decided, because they tend to make things much more complicated than it really 
is.” (Interviewee 8) 
 
“In some cases we don’t use it (proprietary material), just because the negotiation 
process can be painful, it takes a lot of time and sometimes the financial terms on these 
traits or resources are, in my opinion, unreasonable.” (Interviewee 1) 
 
“…however negotiating parties can have conflicting agendas…and the owner of the tool 
may be unwilling to share the tool. They want to hold on to everything they got.” 
(Interviewee 18) 
 
Negotiation costs are particularly burdensome for small firms that lack a strong 
or a cost-efficient legal team; as interviewee 7 indicates, “The cost of negotiating maybe 
out of reach for a small operator.”  
 
In some instances the negotiation process can be so lengthy and severe that some 
individuals start using proprietary material without license under the expectation that the 
license will be obtained sometime in the future. In this way, it is hoped to have some 
time that would otherwise be lost because of negotiations. As interviewee 16 describes: 
“…sometimes when the license is being negotiated we start the work and we start 
negotiating the license. Because I have one example when the negotiation went for more 
than 10 years so we did a lot of work before we actually finished negotiations.”  
      
The quotes presented above indicate that transaction costs and IPRs are 
positively related. However, IPRs could potentially reduce transaction costs. The 
interviewees were asked to indicate instances where IP rights have reduced transaction 
costs. Five out of nine scientists responded that there were no such cases, while four 
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referenced some. When interviewee 14 was asked to indicate cases where IPRs reduce 
transaction costs he responded: “Absolutely, if you can negotiate very early with 
competitors [and] if you have the ability to cross license, have technology that matches 
up well then [you can] cross license and make the deal very quickly…”, Interviewee 21 
indicated “I would say they have reduced transaction costs in some cases because if you 
do your own intellectual property development you don’t have to license it back if 
someone makes improvements and patents them”. Interviewee 15 expresses a similar 
idea, “If it is clearly defined, you know where you are going so in this case it cuts 
negotiating time down and a lot of paperwork that has to be done with it, so that would 
definitely mean reduction in time and money.” 
 
From the preceding analysis it seems that IPRs involve transaction costs, 
particularly negotiation costs. Some of these costs like filing costs and IP personnel 
wages are difficult to avoid. However, other kinds of costs like the time a negotiation 
takes can be cut down. In any case, transaction costs should not be overlooked as they 
do affect research material exchange and access. 
5.5.3. Research exemption 
Access to proprietary tools by the scientific community has been a concern for policy 
makers. Both the Canadian Patent Act and Plant Breeder’s Rights include a research 
exemption. The research exemption aims at minimizing the adverse effects of IPRs 
while preserving the incentive to invest in R&D. Under certain conditions it grants the 
right to make use of a proprietary invention irrespective of the owner’s consent. The 
conditions have to do mainly with the purpose of use of the invention in question. In 
particular, in the Canadian Patent Act, the use for which the authorization is sought must 
be “a public non-commercial use” (section 19.1, subsection 2) for governmental use and 
“the purpose of experiments that relate to the subject matter of the patent” (section 55.2, 
subsection 6) for private use. Thus, a patent may be accessed by the public and the 
private sector for research purposes only. The research exemption in PBR is implicit in 
the definition of rights under the law (PBR section 5(1)). 
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Both acts seem to have taken precautions regarding access to proprietary 
inventions by the breeding community for the advancement of science. However, the 
above enactments are often believed to be inadequate and vague. Conditions such us 
those of section 1, subsection 1 of the Patent Law Act allow for a wide interpretation. 
The application of research exemption may differ from case to case, creating 
uncertainties for R&D firms and breeders regarding its effectiveness and application. To 
examine if breeders trust, use or know of the research exemption they were asked 
whether they think they have a research exemption for patented material. Six out of 
eight answered they do not have a research exemption; one was not sure and one 
answered that he/she has. Here are some of the interviewee’s responses:  
 
“No. I have to worry about them [patents and PBRs] all the time.” (Interviewee 18) 
 
“My understanding is that the research exemption in Canada and in the US doesn’t 
actually give an exemption to conduct research on a patented invention. It only gives an 
exemption for research that would improve the usefulness of the patented invention. So I 
don’t believe there actually is a research exclusion for the purpose that researchers 
would like one, which is to allow research using the patent. I don’t believe that exists.” 
(Interviewee 17)      
 
“I am not sure, at this time we are not using any kind of research exemption. We don’t 
usually operate under research exemption, we usually have research agreement. So we 
are not using [a] technology and we assume we have the right to use it, if we want a 
technology from a company we sign agreements, saying that we have the right to do 
research as opposed to the right to commercialize.” (Interviewee 9) 
 
“I am going to say no because I know what company’s principles are. So if we know 
that there is a patent out there that there is the possibility that covers our material then 
we would like not to touch it.” (Interviewee 1) 
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These quotes indicate that research exemption is not being used by the majority 
of the canola breeders because it provides coverage only to research conducted for non-
commercial purposes. Since the main focus of private and public canola research is the 
production of new products and traits with commercial value, the applicability of 
research exemption to contemporary canola research is low.    
5.6. Access to current material 
The exchange of ideas and views among researchers is an important part of science. As 
new information is being circulated and new experience is gained, scientists acquire new 
knowledge. The sharing of views within a research community contributes to the 
learning activity of those who produce scientific output, thereby advancing science. 
Events like conferences and workshops have been devised in academic, research, 
administration and other communities where individuals have the chance to meet and 
discuss ongoing research and contemporary issues. In many instances, these conferences 
offer the chance to meet new people in the same industry or area of interest, forge 
relationships and even create partnerships. Communication, therefore, in this sense reaps 
multiple rewards to scientists and those involved in R&D.  
Canola breeding has had a tradition of an open research community. Due to the 
public character of canola research in its early years of development, the information 
developed for the crop was diffused throughout the industry. Researchers from different 
agencies and organizations cooperated with each other and worked collectively (Gray et 
al., 2001). The result of this endeavour was the development of canola. Today, with 
IPRs in place, the research environment has changed. Breeders and organizations appear 
more reluctant to share information among themselves. The fear that a competing 
laboratory will invent and patent first, wasting the investments made by a laboratory for 
a particular project, makes actors reluctant to share not only technical information, but 
also information regarding current research and areas of interest. The most common way 
to protect these areas when research is not yet complete and patents have not yet been 
issued is to keep the research secret.  
To examine the extent to which breeders are willing to discuss their research 
with other breeders, interviewees were asked about their views regarding secrecy. Two 
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thirds of the breeders strongly agree or agree with the proposition that secrecy has 
increased over the last 5-10 years. Figure 5.3 shows the full distribution of the 
responses.  
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Figure 5.3. Secrecy over the last 5-10 years. 
Source: Interviews by the author. 
 
The interviewees’ views about secrecy underscore the argument that a transition 
is underway from a liberal regime regarding the flow of knowledge to a more restrictive 
one. The breeders that were interviewed expressed a number of views about this matter. 
 
“So, secrecy yes, it has gone up. Breeders used to share. It was who had the best 
selection program. You truly trade some lines, you know, I am looking for certain fatty 
acid profile line and you might say yes, I have got one of those and then they may ask 
you for some. Breeders would trade stuff. The real gain was to see who could come up 
with something before the other. But they would try to assist each other because it was 
sort of like left and right hand situation. If you never shared any of your stuff, you never 
got any new stuff. So you had to depend on yourself solely. The more you shared, the 
more you got back, in general. So public plant breeders always worked in that premise. 
And over the years it worked. But that has gone away to some degree. Now you have 
public institutions tied in with private and you have to be more careful in what you are 
doing.” (Interviewee 10) 
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“A number of years ago we had canola industry days and canola meetings. The breeders 
and the industry would stand up and describe what they were working on. It seemed to 
be very open and people would ask questions. As years have went past there is less and 
less of that, there is less companies standing up and say this is what we are working on 
and as government, we used to work with anybody. Now we do not say anything. We 
are told by the business office “you can’t do that”, “you can’t say this”. We have prior 
knowledge here, we can’t go and discuss it elsewhere and they concern about patents 
and freedom to operate and things like that, so I think it is really coming down from the 
business office in terms of what we can say and what we can’t.” (Interviewee 22) 
 
“We used to sit down at coffee and discuss our research and all sorts of interesting 
comments and suggestions would come forward to help. You don’t dare to do that 
anymore and from that perspective you lose something, you lose the outside view, a 
different perspective. You lose the opportunity to broaden your project or improve your 
project with what somebody else knew from pathology, entomology or genetics. It tends 
to restrict the dissemination of knowledge…over there we could get a coffee and sit 
down and brainstorm, two-three times a week. And then another scientist would come 
over and say how we could fit in with what he was doing and so on. But we had no 
formal agreement. Nobody signed anything and it all came in together and resulted in 
something that was truly significant.” (Interviewee 7)  
 
“My reading of it is that the government institutions are really interested in proprietary 
rights now. They were not in the past. They are interested in owning and licensing any 
of their inventions. For that reason they don’t want to talk about what they are doing, 
only after it has been done. Whereas in the past all those discussions were going on all 
the time, about what I was doing, what they were doing because it was all of them 
completely into the public domain. But that has gone away in the emphasis on 
proprietary rights by the government, wanting to own patents and license those patents 
or sell them.” (Interviewee 11) 
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“…I have always considered that willingness to discuss your current research with 
others was a key component of having a successful operation. This approach has 
certainly been curtailed to almost an extreme at the present time.” (Interviewee 18) 
 
“Everybody knows what everyone else is doing but nobody talks about it. It has 
increased to ridiculous levels.” (Interviewee 20) 
 
“There was one case last week. A visitor wanted to come and talk to me but the business 
office was concerned about this person and the possibility to take information and see 
what was going on in the rest of the lab. That’s not the way I like it. A number of years 
ago this wasn’t a problem. We had people coming and talk with them. I think everybody 
seems to be closing up and there is not much freedom of information.” (Interviewee 3)  
  
“Secrecy has increased over the years. The sharing of ideas for the development of 
cultivars and germplasm among plant breeders still exists today, but some approaches 
are not disclosed because of their potential economic impact on the industry. This is all 
the result of IP protection legislation that was introduced over the last few years. It’s all 
money driven. Before that the goal was to develop new cultivars and publish scientific 
research in peer reviewed scientific journals. There always was some secrecy about the 
research I did, because I wanted to be the first to come out with new exciting 
developments.” (Interviewee 2) 
There are breeders who disagree that secrecy has increased over the last 5 to 10 
years. For example, interviewee 12 indicated that “I don’t think secrecy has increased 
over the last five years, maybe in the last ten years. I would generally disagree with 
that.” Also, interviewee 6 disagreed and responded that in the last three years it has 
actually decreased.  
Overall, the responses indicate that secrecy has increased compared to twenty or 
thirty years ago. Organizations have recognized the trend and have worked to address it. 
For example, interviewee 22 said that “With regard to other government institutions we 
are more likely to work together with other…institutions, they are trying to promote us 
to work together because in this way we can provide information easier. It is the same 
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for Universities but with private industry it seems to be very difficult to give them more 
information.” So, for governmental institutions, which up to a point share a common 
goal of producing and providing public goods, it seems that secrecy can be fought 
through cooperation. For private firms however, apart from formal collaborations, 
secrecy is likely to remain.  
The difference between secrecy in government and private organizations is 
reflected in interviewees’ views regarding the likelihood of competing organizations 
sharing research tools or germplasm. Figure 5.4 reveals that the likelihood of sharing is 
low in the canola industry. Universities and private industry are “very likely” to share 
research material with other laboratories. The views on governmental institutions are 
diverse and no trend can be drawn as to the likelihood of sharing.  
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Figure 5.4. Likelihood distribution of research tool sharing among canola 
breeders. 
Source: Interviews by the author.  
 
Up to now, sharing was examined by measuring third parties willingness to 
provide research tools. Another way to check the sharing that is going on in canola 
breeding is to ask breeders directly if they have ever denied a request for a research tool 
and the reason for doing so. Table 5.4 shows that half of the interviewees have refused 
at least one time, if so, a research tool. Furthermore, interviewees were asked to indicate 
one or more reasons for doing so. Interestingly, as figure 5.5 shows, only 30% of the 
reasons relate to scientific competition. The remainder concerns reasons exogenous to 
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the research community such as contract forms with the funding agency, commercial 
concerns and institutional requirement. It seems that the introduction of IPRs has 
affected directly and indirectly the behavior of breeders regarding the sharing of 
research tools.    
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Figure 5.5. Why information is not shared among canola breeders. 
Source: Interviews by the author. 
 
5.7. Collaboration in Canola R&D 
Historically collaborations have played a prominent role in canola breeding efforts. The 
creation of canola itself was a result of various actors’ participation (e.g. AAFC, RAC) 
at the technical and the funding level (Gray et al., 2001). In recent years collaborations 
are useful for one more reason: they are a way of potentially bringing together pieces of 
intellectual property owned by different organizations, enabling the realization of new 
technologies. In this way, they contribute to knowledge generation overcoming the IP 
barriers. Below are some benefits of collaboration as recognized by the breeders: 
 
“It has made us vastly more productive.” (Interviewee 17) 
 
“Generally it has a positive impact. Working with industry in collaborative projects is 
always rewarding because industry works in a different way and sets different targets. 
So you get a different perspective on how they actually apply the results that we 
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generate from the projects. Working with plant breeding industry, they have very large 
number of plants, a huge number of plants and samples going through labs. We get very 
good feedback on how utilizing the tools” (Interviewee 12) 
 
“…they also allowed us to do research in areas where we now would not have been able 
to do. It allowed us to prepare the next generation of germplasm that we could offer 
once we had exhausted present type of material.” (Interviewee 23) 
 
“Collaborations have given us access to other germplasm and to other research 
facilities.” (Interviewee 9)  
 
“…allow research in areas otherwise blocked.” (Interviewee 2) 
 
However, collaborations are far from being a solution to the tragedy of the 
anticommons. First, there must be a profit incentive for two or more organizations to 
collaborate. This means that the venture must be profitable and that each contributor will 
gain from participation. The profitability of the venture depends on two factors: the total 
revenues acquired by the commercialization of the new technology and the costs 
implemented for its realization. Even though the former can be assumed as being 
independent from intellectual property rights, the latter is not. The various owners of IP, 
in a hypothetical example of collaboration, will have to come to an agreement to a 
number of issues such as technical issues, the economic exploitation of the new 
technology, possible restrictions, each participant’s share of the costs and the profits and 
so on. Consensus on these various subjects is not achieved without cost; extended 
negotiations, paperwork and enforcement of the agreed terms requires legal and other 
related services. The higher are these, the less profitable is the venture. If the total costs 
are high enough or the revenues are low enough or both, the collaboration will not take 
place. Therefore, it seems that collaborations may be a solution to the patent thicket 
problem when the new technology is profitable. Problems may nevertheless arise if the 
technology has high social benefits but low private benefits. Interviewee 18 describes 
such a case: 
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 “…one of the things that I could never understand is why couldn’t we put together a 
consortium, to have varieties resistant to the diamond back moth; the genes are known 
and available and we have the pest that is here frequently…the chances of that 
population developing resistance to the genes at least from a perspective of Western 
Canada, is really not a good reason for not having our varieties being resistant. I think 
the problem was first that the companies did not want to release their genes to a 
consortia. Second was the difficulty of recovering research costs because you would be 
selling protection insurance, since the insect is not going to be there every year so how 
can we charge. If we charge a fair amount of money for the presence of that resistance 
gene and the farmer would say well, it is going to cost me more than a variety that hasn’t 
got it so I’ll bet that this year I won’t have to spray for diamond backs. But we should 
have it done, we still should do it, on a cooperative basis. It has been suggested many 
times but we haven’t been able to put it together. There are too many pieces in too many 
different places. It is an example of how the germplasm and knowledge don’t always 
overcome the profit motive, the knowledge is there but the will and the profit isn’t.”  
 
Second, for collaborations to solve the anticommons problem, the resulting 
technology should be made available to the research society. The reason is that if the 
new technology is protected by IPRs and cannot be used for the research of other 
technologies by third parties, it creates anew a tragedy of anticommons. With 
collaborations, existing technological pieces may be brought together, but if the output 
is proprietary, all that collaborations do is transfer the IP problem to the future. 
Therefore, collaborations do not solve the tragedy of anticommons but rather postpone. 
In the pyramid framework that would mean that if IPP1 and IPP2 technologies could be 
combined due to collaboration among the two owning firms and the resulting 
technology (IPP3) becomes proprietary, the realization of downstream technology, e.g. 
Tech 1, can only be developed if access can be obtained for IPP4. If IPP3 and IPP4 are 
held by different owners that have the incentive to block each other from accessing 
them, then Tech 1 will not be developed. 
 
 68
  
 
 
Tech 1  
 
IPP2 IPP1 
IPP 4 IPP 3  
 
 
 
  
 
 Figure 5.6. The tragedy of the anticommons created anew. 
  
The nature of collaboration’s research output is highly dependent on the 
ownership structure of the collaboration. If the collaboration takes place between two 
private companies, the new technology is expected to be proprietary: without ownership 
it is doubtful that the two firms could recoup their investments. Therefore, in this case, 
the majority of the research output can be expected to be protected. If the collaboration 
takes place between two public organizations, the produced technology could be made 
publicly available: the purpose of public institutions, at least theoretically, is to deliver 
public goods to society. However, the prospect of two public institutions collaborating is 
neither attractive nor likely. Interviewee 23 explains: 
 
“It [the collaboration] is mainly with private sector, public sector is more on a level 
where you go to meetings, meet the other researchers, exchange ideas if you like to do 
so, but no formal agreements in the sense that we have with the private industry. We 
have these formal agreements because public sector organizations don’t have money to 
give, we are going out to get money rather than exchanging money with other public 
institution, that wouldn’t make much sense.”  
 
 69
In recent years, public research organizations are vividly engaged in patenting 
activity. The reduced budgets for public research that Canada has experienced in the last 
years is another reason public organizations are more likely to collaborate with private 
industry rather than with other public institutions. As interviewee 2 indicates: 
 
“The impact that it [collaboration] had was on our ability to continue the work that we 
do with dwindling federal research funding, especially after the 1995 budget and a series 
of cutbacks. We had germplasm of interest to the industry. The outside funding allowed 
us to do research that is of value to Canadian agriculture and to canola in this case.” 
 
In examining the dependence of public institutions on private funding, canola 
breeders were asked to state the total outside funding received over the last 5 years as a 
percentage of their total resources. From the four responses that were obtained, the 
average percentage is 70%, illustrating that a large proportion of public research is being 
funded in conjunction with private industry. Therefore, it seems that public institutions 
are more likely to form collaborations with private firms rather than public 
organizations.  
 
Unlike the collaborations among public institutions, where the resulting research 
is expected to be publicly available, collaborations between public and private partners 
are very likely to engage in patenting activity. As interviewee 13 explains, 
 
“For projects where we are getting funding from the government then it makes sense 
that we try to get the data available to everyone in the community as quickly as possible. 
But when you have these projects with companies we have to develop specific 
agreements related to how are we going to manage the data, how long it has to be 
confidential and then we have to respect those agreements because obviously they have 
responsibilities to produce cultivars that have a commercial advantage. We are always 
going to have that aspect when we are working with companies.”          
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“Usually, in multiparty agreements, Canada has the ownership and Canada itself has the 
right to exploit, but all of the collaborators have equal right to exploit, it is a non-
exclusive right. Quite a lot of time, Canada also has the right to license to third parties 
but at a cost considerably above the cost to the original companies collaborating with us 
in the research.” (Interviewee 17) 
 
It seems that private sector pushes the public sector towards patenting activity; 
the result is that the public sector may be doing more patents than it otherwise would. To 
check if this holds, interviewees were asked to state the impact of their collaboration on 
their intellectual property activity. Here are some of their responses: 
 
“PBRs was something that industry funding required us to do and more and more the 
interest of patenting technology that comes out of the collaboration with the industry 
partner and those applications for patents are just being submitted or being prepared. 
They have not yet issued but that is getting more and more the case.” (Interviewee 23) 
 
Researcher: “So, do you argue that your collaborations increased your IP activity?” 
Interviewee 12: “Well it does, yes. Private industry is very keen on agreements…” 
 
It seems the research output produced by private and public partnership becomes 
the subject of protection mostly because in this way the private sector enables the 
commercialization of the technology and the recoupment of the costs. For the public 
sector, the assignment of IPRs to the new technology has a positive and a negative 
effect. The positive effect is that public organizations secure vital funding for the 
continuation of their research while the negative concerns the production of proprietary 
instead of public knowledge. The latter effect has been an issue lately and public 
organizations are starting to raise the question of what is going to be proprietary and 
what is going to be public from their collaboration with private firms. Interviewee 8 
explains: 
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“Historically we develop them with a high percentage of industrial money, at the 
beginning we were making agreements where everything that was developed with the 
public money and the industry money was confidential because the industry wanted to 
do it that way. In the last four years we have been negotiating very hard for the 
proportion of things that are developed using public money to go to the public domain 
and the proportion of things developed using the industry money don’t go to the public 
domain. Then, genomic tools that have been developed using public money has all gone 
into the public domain or will go into the public domain. So probably about 30% of 
what is developed currently has gone to the public domain and then 65% will go to the 
public domain in the future.” 
 
Interviewee 13 makes a similar point: 
“We try to ensure that agreements allow us to publish aspects of the project and if this 
can be arranged then we have productive projects. So, for example, with developing 
genetic markers, you have sets of sequences developed that are maintained as 
proprietary information, however, the markers that come out of that produce genetic 
linkage data that we want to be able to publish.  For the Brassica Single Nucleotide 
Polymorphism (SNP) marker project which is now ongoing we have directly combined 
an aspect of public availability to a 1/3 of the sequence data we are generating. The 
other 2/3 will remain proprietary. This was done because we had requests from the 
Brassica genetics research community indicating that it would be really beneficial to the 
community to have the right to use a portion of the SNP markers being generated.  
Researchers will be free to use them as they wish. So that is a normal thing that we do 
with the new projects, to ensure that a portion of the sequence data will be publicly 
available.”  
 
Therefore, it is observed that collaborations between public and private firms 
result in a shift from fully to partially proprietary knowledge. The research community 
benefits as public organizations ensure that a part of the research output is published. 
The existence of published portion reduces the likelihood of a tragedy of the 
anticommons, although it does not rule it out. 
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5.8. Infringement 
In other industries, like music and software, piracy is widespread (check Romer). 
However, piracy is most likely to happen when the infringers are large in numbers (e.g. 
consumers) and litigation becomes prohibitively costly, rather than when the infringers 
are few, easy to trace and profitable to chase legally (e.g. private firms). The canola 
industry falls into this second category. Even though some R&D organizations, 
particularly public, may not have the funds to challenge infringers, canola breeders, 
private and public, show particular caution in not using proprietary material without a 
license. To the question “How often do you use patented material or processes without a 
license?” all of them (9 out of 9) answered “Never”. Also, when they were asked how 
often they look into the IP access of the research tools that they use, five breeders 
answered always, one answered in 80% of the cases and one in 50% of the cases. These 
results indicate that canola R&D firms do not consider infringement as a strategy to 
overcome IP barriers. As interviewee 17 explains, “I think for an organization that has 
limited liability, ignoring things is a possibility. For X which does not have limited 
liability I think ignoring patents it is not an option. I think some of the patents could be 
challenged in court, but it is a very expensive business and you have to be able to make 
a lot of money by bringing down someone else’s patent in order to make a court based 
solution viable.”   
5.9. Inventing around 
Inventing around in plant breeding is another mean of overcoming a patent. Patents 
usually protect ways or methods in achieving a particular result. In order to reach the 
desirable outcome, R&D organizations have either to obtain a license from the patent 
holder to use the protected process or to find a new way that yields the same result. 
When the former is unattainable (e.g. when the required royalties are too high), R&D 
firms devote time and money to invent around the patent. A successful inventing around 
can be then licensed to third parties and can act as a competitor to the original patent. A 
common feature of inventing around, however, is the use of different methods than 
disclosed in the patent. Firms that invent around often change marginally the original 
method so that the new one does not infringe the patent, while being able to generate the 
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desirable outcome. The problem arises when the marginal changes are unclear as to 
whether they infringe or not the original patent. In this case, the dispute is resolved in 
courts, often at substantial cost.     
Therefore, the tactic of inventing around has both advantages and disadvantages. 
Avoiding a patent and the high possibility of litigation are the obvious ones. The 
following quotes outline views on inventing around and throw light on some of its 
positive and negative aspects:   
 
“I have myself invented around the IP or trademark, but that is costly…if it [inventing 
around] is successful it may lead to significant economic activity.” (Interviewee 11)  
 
“Invent around is always a possibility and is often used. Again, why should I invent 
around if a technology already exists? When you invent around you have to be different 
from the original invention and in many cases this is difficult to achieve. This is 
particularly true for patented products where inventing around is virtually impossible. 
Furthermore, there is a possibility the owner of the original invention to claim that is not 
new. I don’t know of a successful inventing around. So I don’t know what the point of 
inventing around is, but there are other institutions which do that or try to do that.” 
(Interviewee 2) 
 
“I know several projects to invent around patents; I know of about $700,000 of research 
funding going historically into that research area, but I think scientists are becoming 
much more reticent about doing this type of research, especially in a climate where 
publications are so big a component of a scientist’s output. Inventing around doesn’t 
lead to publications. Doing something in a slightly different way than someone else did 
several years before, isn’t the sort of thing that researchers are trained to do. We want to 
be first, it is part of the motivation of the job.” (Interviewee 8) 
 
 From the above, it becomes apparent that while inventing around may lead to 
new discoveries that can be better from the original, in many cases the invented method 
does not deviate much from the original. This has two consequences. First there are 
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small incentives for the researcher to repeat other’s work in a slightly different way and 
second there is a high probability that both the patent holder and the inventor to be 
engaged in a legal dispute. Therefore, inventing around, even though it can be used to 
overcome IP barriers, does not seem to be appealing, at least at the researchers’ level.   
     
5.10. Difficulties with R&D 
To check the severity of the consequences of blocked access to research materials, 
interviewees were asked to indicate whether there had been any cases where they could 
not get the research tools/germplasm and decided to cease the project. Five out of eight 
answered affirmatively. The following quotes describe several instances where blockage 
caused problems: 
    
  “…we thought we had access to the market where were selling a product and a 
submarine patent popped up and the submarine patent blocked us from having market 
access and so it has been extremely difficult to negotiate with a patent owner because 
our base germplasm was so much better that they refused to give us rights to the patent 
even though we were first to market it…” (Interviewee 1) 
 
“There are two specific ones, one where they just wouldn’t agree with the terms and 
conditions by the crown and the other one…they were unwilling to share because as a 
public company we didn’t have a commercial arm.” (Interviewee 5) 
 
“I know of a number of projects that didn’t receive federal or provincial funding because 
of concerns over freedom to operate. I do know of projects that were stopped because 
patents that were submarine for years in the Canadian patent system actually came out 
and it became obvious that the organizations doing the research would never be able to 
commercialize anything. ” (Interviewee 17) 
 
“The intellectual property was a transgenic trait and in that case the real reason was that 
the regulatory costs would be too high and then the company who had the intellectual 
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property would have to take on the regulatory cost but they were not willing to do that.” 
(Interviewee 16) 
 
“The cost was too high. It was prohibitive to obtain IPRs. Sometimes [the cost] is as 
high as the research cost.” (Interviewee 19) 
 
Canola breeders were also asked if the length of time that research takes has increased 
due to stronger IP protection. Two out of seven believe that it has significantly 
increased, three that it has somewhat increased and two that it has not increased.  
 
Breeder: “In terms of negotiating licenses, absolutely. Lot’s of delays. But in terms once 
freedom to operate is there, then [it is] ok.”  
Interviewer: “Any sense of the maximum delay that you have experienced?” 
Breeder: “There was one actually that it took 3 or 4 years. Just because of the inability to 
negotiate with the competitor.” (Interviewee 14) 
 
“In one of our programs we delayed for about five months because we were not able to 
get the material sent to us, so there has been a delay there.” (Interviewee 22) 
 
“Yes, I think the answer would be “yes, it significantly increased”…I think the scientists 
are compensating by finding ways to be expected to write patents for technologies that 
will never actually go anywhere…It can be incredibly distractive from research if you 
have to write patents.” (Interviewee 8) 
 
“It is increased somewhat. I think sometimes are delays when negotiating licenses or 
MTAs.” (Interviewee 9) 
 
“It takes longer to commercialize it but I don’t think it takes longer to complete the 
research.” (Interviewee 2)  
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 Therefore, the proliferation of IPRs seems to have caused impediments to canola 
research, both in terms of delays and cancellation of research projects. As interviewee 7 
explains,   
“I believe that the present Plant Breeder’s Rights legislation specifically allows breeders 
to use PBR registered varieties in their breeding programs but the industry has taken the 
stand that you need the company’s agreement to use their varieties in other breeding 
programs. I think that is wrong. Germplasm exchange has become a particular sensitive 
issue and unfortunately it has become, at least with canola, a real constraint to making 
significant industry wide improvements. I would say that X, in its zeal to try and capture 
some of the benefits of patenting and plant breeder’s rights, have made the exchange of 
basic material much more difficult than it ought to be. I don’t think there are many that 
would disagree with that assessment. It is making it difficult to build on the advances of 
others because plant breeding relies heavily on the ability to use as platforms, the best 
varieties and innovations to make the next step forward, and that has been hampered to a 
large degree.” (Interviewee 7)           
 
 The introduction of IPRs in the Canadian canola industry has led to difficulties in 
research that have been identified by the breeders. The range of difficulties include slow 
flow of knowledge, the use of strategic restrictions on licensing, high transaction costs 
and uncertainty regarding future research due to the existence of submarine patents. The 
consequences of these difficulties concern the quantity and quality of the research 
output. Time losses and cancelled projects are the most obvious consequences and 
concern the quantity of the research produced. However, there may also be impacts on 
the research’s quality particularly when the best research tools/material is not available. 
5.11. Reaction: Development of Platforms 
Canola breeders and researchers have recognized the existence of hurdles in gaining 
access to research material necessary for their research. The magnitude of nuisance 
ranges from delays of the project schedule to the abandonment of the research effort or 
the retraction of the new product from the market. The existence of these impediments 
creates uncertainty with regards to the acquirement of the input research material and the 
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commercialization of the research output. R&D firms often have to negotiate with 
multiple patent holders who often compete in the same markets, as well as to be vigilant 
on new and old patents that can emerge and stall the research or, even worse, the 
commercialization of a new product. To address the uncertainty related to the 
acquirement of proprietary knowledge, R&D organizations have undertaken several 
strategies. Some of them (collaborations, inventing around) have already been examined 
and we have seen that they do not function ideally; each of them has both advantages 
and disadvantages. The strategy that R&D institutions seem to have largely 
implemented to avoid IPR impediments is the creation of platform technologies, 
technologies that can be used to facilitate a broad range of application based activities. 
Unlike with other technologies, platform technologies endow researchers with freedom 
to operate in research areas, avoiding the menace of submarine patents. The importance 
of freedom to operate issue to plant breeders and their preference in using in-house 
material is depicted in the following quotes: 
 
“Freedom to operate is one of the problems that anybody faces. There are lots of reasons 
why you cannot operate. There are lots of ways a patent holder can prevent you from 
accessing the use of their patent, the royalty maybe too high, the cost of negotiation 
maybe out of reach for a small operator etc. Usually this is not the case with plant 
breeding, however negotiating parties can have conflicting agendas, that is one of them, 
and the owner of the tool may be unwilling to share the tool. They want to hold on to 
everything they got.” (Interviewee 7) 
 
“I am very careful not to accept things from people other than the people who developed 
them. So if there are IP considerations we invariably sign a MTA to receive things in the 
first place. The only time that I am really worried about IP in terms of freedom to 
operate is where I think that I can see something that can lead to a product. And then I 
think the freedom to operate becomes a very serious consideration when you are 
thinking about a company commercializing something.” (Interviewee 17) 
“It is better to have freedom to operate with respect to the project technology to begin 
with, but sometimes that is really not practical. And I think often we worry about it too 
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much. I wish I could put that energy into finding industrial partners who can just work 
out the value of IP and pay for it.” (Interviewee 8) 
 
Interviewer: “Why did you increase your protection?” 
Breeder: “Primarily is a defensive response to make sure we have freedom to operate. 
We are not very concerned about R&D expenditures, is primarily to secure freedom to 
operate.” (Interviewee 1) 
 
“…but as long as we have something patentable we will try to patent to make sure that 
we will have freedom to operate and that we have something to trade.” (Interviewee 6) 
 
Interviewer: “Has your protection of research tools increased over the last 5-10 years? 
Breeder: “Yes, absolutely.” 
Interviewee: “Why did you increase protection?” 
Breeder: “The business office wanted it to ensure freedom to operate.” (Interviewee 13) 
 
“We use research tools that are common knowledge. We don’t get material for which we 
need MTAs. We have material that people come to us and want to use it. We have 
MTAs prepared for that material. We never bring material to the building here to work 
on or to work with.” (Interviewee 23) 
 
“…we never try to get into areas where we have to acquire IP. We don’t want to depend 
on a particular source of germplasm that is owned by other firm.” (Interviewee 2) 
 
Interviewer: “By defensive patenting, do you mean that your first priority is to ensure 
freedom to operate?” 
Breeder: “Yes. That is what we are after. We want to make sure that we can continue 
research and therefore and therefore by patenting that area we can continue on research 
and we have the ability to further the work we are doing or to have it commercialized. 
That is why we look in patenting. It is not to gain any other advantage…what we are 
after is that somebody else can’t put stop to research because if we were to invest so 
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much time and money to an area of research, we want to make sure that it can be used 
for the benefit of Canada.” (Interviewee 10) 
 
Breeder: “There are lots of reasons why we are undertaking intellectual property 
protection. One is to ensure we have freedom to operate with respect to our own 
research.” (Interviewee 4) 
 
 The quotes presented above provide evidence that R&D firms strategically 
choose to use germplasm and research material developed within the firm. By doing so, 
the tragedy of the anticommons is being avoided as there is no need for the firms to 
acquire multiple technological pieces. Of course, total independence in the conducting 
of science is difficult if not impossible to achieve. Knowledge builds upon previous 
knowledge and permission may be required to use this knowledge. Thus, research firms 
(public and private) in canola breeding are keen on opening new research areas where 
there is no prior knowledge and hence no patent owners to deal with. 
5.12. Summary 
Twelve interviewees participated in the survey regarding IPRs in canola breeding. 
Interviewees possess diverse characteristics regarding the type of research they 
undertake, the projects and their funding. However, they share a common feature; they 
have experienced two different regimes, one with no IPRs and one with IPRs in place. 
Interviewees verified that the canola sector has seen an increased use of patents and 
PBRs that protect intellectual property from potential infringers. This experience allows 
the interviewees to speak informatively about the impact of the change in IPRs. As 
canola breeders change from patenting to publishing, the amount of research output that 
is available to the research community diminishes. Even though patents can be licensed 
for a price, there are substantial transaction costs involved, rendering licensing in some 
cases prohibitively expensive. As the data indicate, the research exemption provided by 
the Canadian Patent Act does not have wide application as the majority of public and 
private research targets commercial applications. Lastly, the flow of current material and 
knowledge is hampered by researchers’ unwillingness to share their results with other 
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researchers. To a large degree, this unwillingness is due to the strategic situation faced 
by the researchers’ employers; competition in R&D is fierce and any leakage of 
information by one company may put at risk its innovative effort and investments.  
 There are various ways through which proprietary research can be accessed. 
Collaborations is the most common example, as two parties with complementary IP find 
it more cost efficient to collaborate rather than license each other’s technology. 
However, due to the proprietary nature of the research resulting from the collaborations, 
the problem of access is not solved but rather is postponed for the future. Inventing 
around a technology is another way by which R&D firms avoid patents. The drawbacks 
of this method are the high cost and the reduced motive for the breeders. Lastly, 
infringement is rarely used by R&D firms as it involves a high risk and cost. 
 Blocked access to important technologies and the lack of alternative means to 
overcome this hurdle appear to be causing difficulties in canola breeding research. These 
difficulties include delays, cancellation of projects or a lack of participation in research 
areas where proprietary knowledge exists. Thus, freedom to operate in canola breeding 
is of importance to R&D firms and is something that R&D policies should take into 
account.
 81
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1. Introduction 
The assignment of intellectual property rights in the canola industry in the latter part of 
the 20th century brought about significant changes in the structure and development of 
the canola industry. IPRs induced significant private investment in the sector and led to 
the development of a large number of new varieties. At the same time, although there is 
little evidence available specifically for canola, arguments were being put forward (e.g. 
Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) to suggest that enhanced IPRs might have negative effects 
on R&D through high transaction costs, increased secrecy among researchers and 
reduced sharing of information. The purpose of this thesis was to explore this last 
question by conducting a survey of canola breeders. 
 This chapter begins with a summary of IPRs’ negative impact on R&D. The 
research environment in the last 20-30 years in the canola sector is characterized by 
increasing patenting activity. As public and private research firms protect their 
intellectual products, several hold-ups appear as a result of this activity. All these 
hurdles share a common effect, namely that of blocked access to research tools 
necessary for further research. The chapter continues with a description of the major 
forms of reaction against the observed intellectual property protectionism. R&D firms 
have come up with various strategies to ensure freedom to operate. Lastly, 
recommendations for further research are discussed regarding the role of the public 
sector in the canola sector, the winners and the losers associated with increased IP 
protection and the evolving structure of the canola industry.    
6.2. IPRs’ negative impact on R&D 
The data presented in Chapter 5 indicate that IP protection appears to create difficulties 
for canola breeders in conducting their research. These difficulties are illustrated and 
summarized in figure 6.1. Specifically, the evidence collected from the interviews 
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indicate that increased IP activity in the canola sector during the last 20 to 30 years has 
reduced the sharing of knowledge-information among breeders, increased transaction 
costs and negatively affected the research material that is publicly available. Secrecy has 
reduced the flow of information among breeders and research institutions, while there is 
an indication that sharing of research material follows the same trend. Canola breeders 
appear to be unwilling to disclose their inventions, at least not before patenting has taken 
place.   
 The new regime established with the arrival of IPRs requires that most 
transactions take place among institutions rather than among breeders. The consequence 
of this change is reduced access to current material and ongoing research that could 
potentially enrich or complement other research efforts. An additional element that 
ensues from institutions’ elevation to main players in material exchange is the 
formalization of the transactions. Arrangements across organizations are carried out 
mainly through negotiations, an expensive process both in terms of time and money.  
These costs add to the increased transaction costs related with the management and 
operation of IPRs. Therefore, transactions like licensing and trade of patents are 
encumbered by additional costs, rendering access to proprietary material expensive and 
difficult to occur.  
With respect to publicly available material it seems that it is “drying out” as 
organizations prefer patenting over publishing to ensure freedom to operate. Of course 
patenting itself is a way of publishing as it involves a description of the new invention; 
however a patent means that the use and exploitation of the revealed information in 
research with commercial purposes is prohibited. Thereby, the trend of increasing 
patenting leaves the research community with less available research material to work 
with, confining the opportunities for research. 
The interviews also suggested that plant breeders were using a number of 
strategies to minimize the impact of these difficulties. Collaborative activity and 
inventing around are ways that could potentially alleviate the problem of blocked access 
to research material, but there are limits to what they can accomplish. Collaborations 
that are formed in the canola industry mainly involve public and private institutions. 
This has an impact on the availability of the research output produced from the 
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partnership. Private firms seek ownership of the produced technology thereby putting 
constraints on those wishing to access it. To the extent that the knowledge produced by 
partnerships becomes proprietary, collaborations create the tragedy of the anticommons 
anew. Inventing around, although appealing for R&D firms that look to overcome a 
particular patent, is a risky venture and requires a large amount of resources. Moreover, 
inventing around existing technologies provide small, if any, motives to researchers. 
Research tools can be viewed as the sum of current, proprietary and free 
material. Blocked access to research tools has been identified as taking place in each of 
these three categories and in aggregate. Secrecy and reduced sharing block access to 
current material, while limited applicability of research exemption and high transaction 
costs deters access to proprietary material. The clear preference of patenting over 
publishing blocks access to free or public material as the public pool of knowledge is 
shrinking. Lack of access to current, proprietary and free material causes difficulties in 
R&D since they are used as inputs for the creation and production of new technologies 
and products. At the aggregate level, the lack of access to research material is verified 
by the inadequacy of methods used to overcome IP barriers, such as collaboration and 
inventing around. Hence, as the figure 6.1 illustrates, the blocked access to research 
materials, combined with insufficient alternatives leads to difficulties with R&D such as 
delays or abandonment of research efforts.   
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research material 
No research 
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Increased protection 
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applications 
- Increased protection 
of research tools 
- High level of current 
control
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-Sharing is 
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-50% have 
denied a 
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research tools 
-50% are 
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disclose their 
inventions and 
share them 
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owned by 
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of research 
exemption 
 
Increased 
Transaction costs 
-The majority of 
breeders check IP 
access status 
-Time needed to 
manage IP has 
increased. 
-The average 
number of persons 
involved in IP has 
tripled. 
-38% breeders had 
to negotiate 
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transaction costs 
-Patenting is 
preferred from 
publishing 
-On average, 
22.5% of the 
research tools go 
to the public 
domain
Inventing 
around
Collaborations 
- Does not 
motivate 
researchers 
- Requires 
additional 
resources  
- Produce 
proprietary 
knowledge.  
Ways to overcome 
IP barriers but 
they malfunction. 
Lack of access to 
free material 
Difficulties with R&D 
Lack of access to 
proprietary tools 
Lack of access to 
current material  +  + 
Lack of access 
to research tools = 
-62% had to cease their project at least one time 
-50% have experienced research delays 
Figure 6.1. IPRs’ interference with R&D.
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6.3. Change of behavior 
The application of biotechnology in the canola R&D sector has brought about some 
important changes, at various levels, in the way research is planned and implemented by 
research institutions. As the review of the literature indicated, owners of IP have an 
incentive to overcharge those that wish to license the technologies (Buchanan and Yoon, 
2000) creating the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). As the data 
from the survey indicate, the freedom to operate issue is important to public and private 
organizations. 
 Not surprisingly, the research community has introduced strategies by which the 
tragedy of the anticommons can be addressed. One strategy is the development of 
platform technologies, technologies with broad use that endow researchers with multiple 
research paths. Once a platform technology has been developed, other applications may 
take place upon that technology, allowing the continuation of research without the need 
to obtain licenses. A similar strategy that is often employed is the development of 
varieties using in-house material, thus eliminating the need for and the dependence on 
other R&D organizations. Some breeders reported that they do not use material from 
other organizations as this would render their current and future innovation dependent 
on the licensed material.  
A second strategy in avoiding the tragedy of the anticommons is collaboration. 
When two or more R&D organizations possess complementary technologies, then 
research collaboration among the firms can avoid the need for each of them to pay the 
others for licenses. In canola research, the collaborations formed among research 
partners overcome the tragedy of the anticommons only to the extent that the research 
output is published. If, however, all or part of the research product becomes proprietary, 
the tragedy of the anticommons is postponed as those needing the proprietary 
technology in the future will have to obtain a license. Inventing around completes the set 
of strategies R&D firms currently use to succeed freedom to operate, even though this 
strategy is seldom used.  
Given the various ways employed by public and private firms to ensure freedom 
to operate, the tragedy of the anticommons effects may not be obvious. The fact that 
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R&D organizations continue to produce research, sometimes at an increasing rate, does 
not negate or disprove the tragedy of anticommons. R&D firms are observed to find new 
ways (creating technological platforms, collaborate, invent around) to ensure access to 
critical material/research tools, thereby partly alleviating the tragedy of the anticommons 
problem. Comments by canola breeders indicate that there are still obstacles (tedious 
negotiations, secrecy among researchers) that block access to research material. In 
addition, transaction costs, both in terms of money and time, appear to be important in 
slowing down the exchange of research material.  
6.4. Genomics and FTO 
Genomics have become an integral part of plant breeding. The systematic study of a 
plant’s genome and more specifically the identification of a gene’s function and its 
linkage to specific traits (also known as functional genomics) has opened new roads for 
plant breeding and crop improvement. By understanding why certain traits are 
expressed, which sets of genes are specifically responsible for that expression and under 
what conditions, scientists are able to create varieties with exact combinations of traits 
(CIMMYT, 2000). Genomics and its tools have helped plant genetic researchers to work 
faster and more precisely.  
The federal government has recognized the necessity of genomics in plant 
breeding and has responded to this need by establishing genome centers throughout 
Canada. These centers provide a range of platform services such as custom microarray 
gene expression, DNA mapping and DNA sequencing (Genome Canada, 2007). In 
addition to these research centers, the federal government has initiated genomic research 
within federal labs such as the AAFC and NRC. The purpose of these projects is to bring 
genomics and its tools at the aim of plant breeding for the development of enhanced 
products with specific traits. As Raine et al. 2007 have indicated, “no new research 
project of any scale involving plant breeding takes place without genomics 
support”(Plant Agriculture Genomics Group, 2007).  
The increasing appliance of genomics in plant breeding is expected to render the 
freedom to operate issue more acute in the forthcoming years. If a single gene or a group 
of genes with certain traits can be patented by private R&D firms, the licensing of these 
 87
traits to third parties (e.g. other labs) will be hindered. The owner of a key trait or an 
enabling technology is automatically placed in a strong bargaining position with respect 
to potential buyers, leading to the hold up problem. Things become more complicated 
when several companies possess different genes, the combination of which expresses a 
single plant characteristic. In these cases, there could very easily be a tragedy of the 
anticommons problem, the consequences of which will be the forgoing of the 
exploitation of the trait unless the actions are taken. 
To ensure freedom to operate, R&D firms are developing platform technologies. 
The development of these technologies is a strong indication that the primary and long 
run objective is autonomy in R&D. There is an obvious trend by the R&D firms to 
reduce their dependence on foreign proprietary knowledge and increase their own 
research resources. The adoption of this strategy reduces the risk that an R&D firm runs 
of stumbling on a “submarine” patent and having to negotiate with third parties after 
having incurred sunk costs. Competition is one reason for this behaviour; R&D firms are 
reluctant in giving away any kind of information that would allow competitors to get 
involved in the same research area. The threat of having something patented by a foreign 
firm is another reason; some companies may look through some published data and file 
a patent on the information if it could have commercial value or impact to the company. 
When freedom to operate (FTO) in a research area cannot be ensured by the 
R&D firm (e.g., when there is already proprietary knowledge in that area), FTO will 
have to be secured by using different means. Collaborations is the most prominent one. 
As the data from the interviews indicate collaborations are strategically used to gain 
access to certain research tools or germplasm material. Normally, collaborators share 
access to each others technologies for the sake of mutually developing an improved 
technology or a product that has commercial value. Examples of collaborations can be 
found in some of the largest biotech firms worldwide, like Monsanto, Dow and BASF. 
Monsanto and BASF have engaged in a long-term collaboration for the development of 
high yielding crops and crops that are more tolerant to environmental stresses such as 
droughts (BASF, 2007). Dow and Monsanto have agreed to share herbicide tolerance 
and insect-protection genes for the joint development of a new corn variety, 
SmartStax™ (Food Navigator, 2007). Therefore, when FTO becomes an issue, R&D 
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firms engage in collaborations that allow them conditional access to the desirable 
technologies.    
The freedom to operate problem will have further impacts on the structure of the 
industry and the ability of new firms to enter the market. The companies that first patent 
an important plant attribute (e.g. a gene resistant to a specific pest) have a comparative 
advantage over the newly established R&D firms. In order for the entrant firms to be 
competitive, they will have to acquire certain technologies or genes that have been 
patented, bringing dominant firms in a strong bargaining position. As Fulton and 
Giannakas (2001) have indicated, one remedy to such problems is mergers and 
acquisitions. In other words, the dominant firm will occasionally buy small start-ups that 
can develop a promising technology but lack the capacity and the resources to actually 
develop that technology and transform it to a product. There is indication that this is the 
case in the biotech industry. According to the World Development Report (WDR) 2008, 
the market share in 1997 for the four largest agrochemical and seed companies was 33% 
for agrochemicals and 23% for seeds while in 2004 the concentration ratio of the top 
four companies (CR4) increased to 60% and 33% respectively. With respect to 
biotechnology patents that were issued in the US, the CR4 was 38% in 2004 (WDR, 
2008). Given the fact that the industry is already concentrated, genomics along with 
gene patenting are expected to consolidate the industry further.  
6.5. Recommendations for Further Research 
The tragedy of the anticommons and the pyramid framework are ways to identify and 
explain the adverse impacts of IPRs on R&D. The interview responses support the view 
that access to foreign material/research tools has deteriorated in the past 20 to 30 years. 
 In chapter 3, it was shown that the optimum level of IPR strength that maximizes 
the net R&D output depends on the relative magnitude of the positive and negative 
effects (or the incentives and the disincentives) that the extension of IPRs have on R&D. 
Due to insufficient data regarding the exact shape of the incentive and the disincentive 
curves, three cases were looked, the interior solution and two corner solutions. From this 
examination, no single policy implication regarding the optimum level of IPR strength 
arose. The interior solution calls for a modest level of IPR strength while the corner 
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solutions call for a maximum or minimum IPR strength. Future research on measuring 
the gains and losses accruing from additional extension in IPRs would throw light on 
decision making regarding the optimum scope and length of patents. The tuning of these 
parameters determines the amount of research produced in a society; hence a framework 
that would provide information regarding their impact on R&D needs to be developed. 
This information could then be incorporated into a wider cost-benefit analysis regarding 
the impact of IPRs on society’s welfare. 
Theory and empirical data presented in this thesis indicate that the biotechnology 
industry is dominated by few large firms. Also, the merges and acquisitions as well as 
the multi-billion dollar collaborations that are taking place among the large firms are 
expected to consolidate the industry further. One remedy to this problem would be the 
intervention of the public sector. The intervention could take the form of new legislation 
regarding IPRs towards a looser regime or a more intense involvement of the public 
sector in the production of R&D output. In the second case, the production and 
dissemination of publicly available knowledge is expected to encourage new firms to 
develop their own technological platforms. The barriers to entry for the new R&D firms 
decrease, as more technological building blocks are available for use. An increase in the 
number of firms in the biotech industry would encourage competition and spread the 
generation of knowledge over a larger number of public and private institutions.     
If the public component of the plant breeding sector is to undertake initiatives in 
producing R&D, then an unhampered transfer of knowledge among public institutions is 
necessary. Cooperation is highly recommended, particularly when complement 
technologies are owned by different actors. The need for closer cooperation among 
public institutions becomes more apparent when it is observed that public research 
organizations are increasingly deciding to create technological platforms and to preserve 
knowledge within their organization. 
Given this background, the examination of possible organizational schemes 
among the public institutions across Canada, as well as the measurement of the benefits 
accruing from such ventures, could be the subject of further research. Moreover, 
additional questions arise as to the impact of collaborative activity on the public pool of 
knowledge – i.e. would the collaborations produce proprietary or free knowledge? It is 
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clear that the structure and function of the public institutions requires further 
investigation to determine the set of changes needed to render public sector inviter of 
future research.  
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CANOLA BREEDERS 
 97
 
Questionaire for  
Emmanouil Oikonomou’s M.Sc. Thesis. 
 
SURVEY CONTACT 
Name: _________________________________________________________  
Title: ___________________________________________________________ 
Name of institution: ________________________________________________ 
Indicate type of affiliation with main institution ___________________________ 
 
 
PART 1. IN THIS SECTION WE WOULD LIKE TO LEARN ABOUT YOUR RESEARCH PROFILE 
 
 
1. How long have you been doing wheat/canola breeding? 
YEARS_____________ 
 
 
2. Are you engaged in traditional or biotech breeding? 
o Traditional 
o Biotech 
o Both 
 
 
3. How many research projects have you undertaken in the past 5 years? _____ 
 
 
4. Of the R&D funding that you have control over, what percentage goes to:  
 
Basic research ________________% 
 
Applied research______________% 
Please, specify what type of applied research you do 
 
Development  _______________% 
Development includes variety development, commercial development, germplasm 
development 
 
 
5. How many new varieties of wheat/canola do you on average release every year? 
# of new varieties ___________ 
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6. Research tools include transgenic seeds/plants, germplasm, vectors, markers, cell 
lines, antibodies, drugs, patented genes and databases 
 
(a) How many research tools have you invented?  ____________ 
(b) How many of them are patentable? ____________ 
 
 
7. Please, describe the research tools you have invented. 
 
 
 
 
PART 2. WE WOULD LIKE TO UNDERSTAND THE EXTENT AT WHICH THE INVENTIONS IN 
PLANT BREEDING ARE PROTECTED BY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
 
8. Who owns the intellectual property (including plant varieties) created at your 
institution? 
o The institution owns it 
o The researcher owns it 
o Joint ownership: the institution and the researcher 
o The funding organization owns it 
o No policy on ownership   
 
 
9. Have you (has your institution) engaged in any of the following forms of intellectual 
property protection over the last 5 years? 
 
IP activity Number 
Filing of patent 
applications/provisional 
patent applications 
 
Filing of applications for 
plant breeder’s rights  
Signing of non-disclosure 
agreements  
Other (please, specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
10. How many of the research tools that you have developed have been patented? 
___________________ 
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11. Of the tools that you have developed and patented, what proportion of the patents are 
held in: 
  
US Canada Other 
   
 
 
12. Which of the following have you used most frequently to protect germplasm? 
o Trade secrets 
o Patents 
o PBRs 
o Genetic fingerprinting 
 
 
13. Which of the following have you used most frequently to protect developed 
varieties? 
o Use of hybrid varieties 
o Terminator technology (genetic use restriction technologies that confer sterility 
on re-planted seed)  
o Trade secrets 
o Patents 
o PBRs 
o Signing of technical use agreements 
o Genetic fingerprinting 
o Bag-label contracts 
 
 
14. What percentage of new varieties developed by your institution is protected by plant 
breeder’s rights? 
_______________% 
 
 
15. Has the number of applications for plant breeder’s rights by you increased the last 5 
years? 
 
o YES                         
o NO 
 
 
16. Of the varieties you have developed and obtained IPRs to, what proportion of the 
patents/PBRs are held in: 
US Canada Other 
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17. Generally do you agree that 
 
o Knowledge/germplasm should be freely distributed among researchers 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
             strongly agree                                                                  strongly disagree 
 
 
o You are unwilling to disclose your inventions and share them with other 
researchers 
 
_________________________________________________________ 
             strongly agree                                                                 strongly disagree 
 
 
o You patent/protect research tools that you develop because you are required to 
do so; otherwise you would not patent 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
             strongly agree                                                                  strongly disagree 
 
 
o You always enforce your patents/PBRs, etc. against universities 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
             strongly agree                                                                  strongly disagree 
 
                      Never enforce 
 
 
o You always enforce your patents/PBRs, etc. against industry 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
             strongly agree                                                                 strongly disagree 
 
                      Never enforce 
 
 
18. Has your protection of research tools increased over the last 5-10 years? 
o YES 
o NO 
 
 
19. Why did you increase your protection? 
 
o in response to the patenting of others to ensure freedom to operate 
o to ensure that R&D expenditures are recouped 
o that was the requirement of the funding organization 
o other, please specify   
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PART 3. CONTRACTS AND COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITY 
 
 
20. Do you collaborate with other researchers? 
 
 Private sector Public sector 
Proportion of cases 
where you 
collaborate with: 
  
OF WHICH 
You collaborate 
formally 
  
OF WHICH 
You collaborate 
informally 
  
No collaboration   
 
 
21. Has your collaboration increased over the last 5 years? 
 
Formal collaboration Informal collaboration  
Increased Steady Decreased Increased Steady Decreased
With public 
sector 
      
With private 
sector 
      
 
 
22. How much outside funding have you received over the last 5 years? 
 
o Percentage of total funding _________________% 
 
o Dollar value _____________$ 
 
 
23. For this outside funding who were the sponsors of the R&D contracts undertaken 
over the last 5 years? 
 
R&D supported by Share in total value of contracts 
Federal government  
Provincial Canadian government  
Foreign governments   
Large private firms  
Small private firms  
Grower groups  
Other (please, specify)  
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24. What impact has collaboration had on your research program (e.g. crops, traits, 
processes)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25. What impact has collaboration had on your intellectual property protection activity? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 4. ACCESS TO RESEARCH TOOLS OWNED BY ACADEMIA OR INDUSTRY 
 
 
We would like to learn about the access to upstream discoveries essential to subsequent 
innovation.  
 
Research exemption means that researchers are not liable to patent holders if they 
utilize patented technology during the course of their research without a license from the 
patent holder. 
 
26. As a breeder, do you have a research exemption for patented material? 
o YES 
o NO 
o NOT CERTAIN 
 
 
27. For the two most important projects/programs you are working on, how many pieces 
of IP did you have to negotiate? 
#_________ 
 
 
28. When you use research tools in your research how often do you look into their IP 
access: 
o Never  
o In _________% of the cases 
o Always 
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29. How often do you use patented material or processes without a license? 
o Always 
o In______________% of the cases 
o Never 
 
 
30. Have there been any incidents where you developed a new variety/research tool 
before you had obtained freedom-to-operate? 
o YES 
o NO  (skip to 32) 
 
 
31. How was the issue resolved? 
o You obtained licenses for all IP 
o You had to destroy your invention 
o You re-directed the project to invent around the research tool patent 
o You ignored all intellectual property and proceeded with the commercialization 
of the product despite the allegations of the patent holder 
o Other, please specify 
 
 
32. Have there been any cases where you could not get the research tools and decided to 
cease the project? 
o YES 
o NO 
 
 
33. If there were any cases when you could not obtain the research tools why did it 
happen? 
o the royalty rate was too high 
o negotiations over rights broke down 
o negotiating parties had conflicting agendas and you could not reach an 
agreement with all the rights holders 
o the owner of the tool was unwilling to share the tool  
o Other, please specify 
 
 
34. Legal arrangements (MTAs, licenses) to get access to proprietary research tools 
bring about limitations in using and disseminating your research outputs.  
 
__________________________________________________________ 
strongly agree                                                                   strongly disagree 
 
                      Uncertain 
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35. What proportion of the research tools you are using originated in 
 
 Government 
institutions Universities Private sector 
Proportion of the 
research tools 
   
Percentage that are 
freely accessible  
   
Percentage of 
proprietary tools* 
   
* By proprietary tools we mean tools access to which requires MTAs or licensing 
 
 
 
Sharing your intellectual property with other institutions 
 
36. What proportion of research tools you have developed goes to the public domain? 
____________% 
 
 
37. Have you ever denied a request for a research tool?  
 
o YES 
o NO 
 
 
38. If you don’t provide the research tools, what is the major reason for not sharing the 
information? 
 
o concerns about scientific competition (you wanted to protect the scientific lead) 
o the expense and scarcity of the materials 
o commercial concerns 
o contract forms with the funding institution 
o requirement of your institution 
o other, please specify 
 
 
39. Secrecy (unwillingness to discuss your current research with others) has increased 
over the last 5-10 years? 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
strongly agree                                                                             strongly disagree 
 
                      Uncertain 
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40. How likely is it that laboratories, which compete with you in the same field, would 
provide research tools/materials if you ask them? 
 
 
9 Government institutions 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
           Very unlikely                                                                                very likely 
 
                      Uncertain 
 
 
 
9 Universities 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
           Very unlikely                                                                                very likely 
 
                      Uncertain 
 
 
9 Private industry 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
           Very unlikely                                                                                very likely 
 
                      Uncertain 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 5. The costs and benefits of stronger IP 
 
 
In this section we would like to learn about the costs associated with managing and 
obtaining IP as well as the possible benefits of clearly defined IP rights.  
 
41. What are the costs associated with obtaining IP? 
 
a) Compared to 5 years ago, how many more days per month do you spend 
managing your IP? 
 
________________ days/month 
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b) Does this cover 
 
- an equivalent amount of IP: 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
- an increased amount of IP: 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
c) Compared to 5 years ago, has there been an increase in the number of 
persons involved in IP management in your organization? 
 
o Yes 
- the number of persons involved in managing IP 5 years ago ___________ 
- the number of people involved in managing IP today ____________ 
o No 
 
d) What is the approximate size of this increase in cost? 
 
_____________$/year                                          _________________% of total 
budget 
 
 
e) Compared to 5 years ago, do you require more IP related services (e.g., 
lawyers, IPR officers, negotiators)? 
 
o Yes 
 
o No 
 
 
 
f) If your institution has had to hire IP services (e.g., lawyers, IPR officers, 
negotiators), what are the costs in terms of time and money? 
 
 Time Cost Cost 
5 years ago 
Researcher months CND $ % of total budget 
Institution months CND $ % of total budget 
Program months CND $ % of total budget 
currently 
Researcher months CND $ % of total budget 
Institution months CND $ % of total budget 
Program months CND $ % of total budget 
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g) Has the length of time that research takes increased due to stronger IP 
protection? 
o Yes, it significantly increased 
o Yes, it somewhat increased 
o No 
 
h) How many programs suffered research delays because of the difficulties in 
obtaining IPRs? 
 
___________ out of total ___________ programs 
 
i) What was the maximum delay that you experienced in obtaining IPRs? 
 
________________days/months  
                       
________________% of total time required to complete the project 
 
 
42. What are the benefits of having stronger IP? 
 
a) Are there instances where IP rights reduced transaction costs? [Transaction 
costs are the costs associated with obtaining and managing IPRs, including 
time lost because of the need to obtain IPRs.] 
 
o Yes, please specify 
 
o No 
 
b) Have there been any instances where clearly defined IP rights sped up the 
time the research took? 
 
o Yes, please specify 
 
o No 
 
c) Are there any instances where IP rights increased your ability to invent/work 
around? 
 
o Yes, please specify 
 
o No 
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d) Are there any instances where IP rights allowed you to get access to a 
research tool you would not have had otherwise? 
 
o Yes, please specify 
 
o No 
 
e) In which of the following ways have IPRs benefited you/ your institution/ 
your program? 
 
 
 
• money incentives (profit) Researcher Institution Program 
• recognition cdn $ cdn$ cdn $
• ownership 
• trading chip 
• source of financing for your 
research 
 
   
   
   
• other, please specify    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Follow up questions 
 
1. How is your program affected by what’s happening worldwide in IP? 
 
2. What are your strategies to limit the adverse effects of the changing IP regime 
(e.g. invent around, re-design the construct, ignore all IP (under the guise of 
research exemption), create public databases, challenge patents in court, go 
offshore, etc.) 
 
3. Identify generally cases in which projects were stopped because of the inability 
to obtain the necessary property rights  
 
4. Does the current system make the best use of germplasm (knowledge)? 
 
5. In your view where is the Canadian breeding sector heading with IP? 
 
-THE END- 
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Interview Consent Form 
 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled: Intellectual Property Rights and Plant 
Breeding in Canada 
 
Researcher:                 Emmanouil Oikonomou            (name) 
 
                  306.966.4046                           (phone) 
 
        
Purpose and procedure: We would like to receive your responses to some questions 
about the management of intellectual property at your institution and about the access to 
research tools from other organizations. By intellectual property (IP) we mean plant 
varieties, germplasm, cell lines, genes, process technologies and other property that is 
the result of one’s intellectual efforts. Even though IP is intangible there exists a system 
of legal devices that prevents others from using IP and it is referred to as “intellectual 
property rights”. Intellectual property rights can take a number of different forms. The 
most relevant for agriculture are patents, trade secrets and plant breeder’s rights.  
 
This research project is co-ordinated by the Department of Agricultural Economics (Dr. 
Gray and Dr. Fulton), University of Saskatchewan. The results of this research will 
constitute part of Ms. Viktoriya Galushko’s and Mr. Emmanouil Oikonomou’s thesis 
requirement for a PhD and MSc degree in Agricultural Economics, respectively. The 
research is funded by the Western Grain Research Foundation (WGRF) and the 
Canadian Innovation Research Network (CAIRN). 
 
The purpose of the research is to explore how the application of property rights to 
intellectual property has changed over time, and to examine the impact of this change. 
This research will attempt to understand whether intellectual property rights (IPRs) are 
limiting access to the upstream innovations necessary for further research, and if so, 
whether these limitations are important in the Canadian canola/wheat breeding sector. 
  
Your participation in this study is appreciated and completely voluntary. It is expected 
that the interview should last between 30 and 60 minutes. You may withdraw at any 
time without penalty during this process should you feel uncomfortable or at risk. All 
interviews will be audio taped and you have the right to shut off the tape recorder at any 
time if you choose. You should also feel free to decline to answer any particular 
question(s). Should you choose to withdraw from the study no data pertaining to your 
participation will be retained.  
 
Potential risks: Ms. Galushko and Mr. Oikonomou will make every effort to preserve 
the confidentiality of your comments (see below), but you should be aware that 
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controversial remarks, in the unlikely event they are associated with you, could have 
negative consequences for your relationships with others in the canola/wheat breeding 
industry.  Ms. Galushko and Mr. Oikonomou will try to ensure that your identity is 
protected in the ways described below. If for some reason Ms. Galushko and Mr. 
Oikonomou wish to quote you in some way that might reveal your identity, they will 
seek your permission beforehand.    
 
Potential benefits: Your participation will help document the existence or absence of 
freedom to operate problems arising from the multiple research tools being protected by 
patents. 
 
Findings from this research may help to make the Canadian plant breeding sector more 
responsive to the current economic needs and help to inform policy decisions within 
government. 
 
Storage of Data: The transcripts and original audio recording of the interview will be 
securely stored by the Supervisors (Dr. Gray and Dr. Fulton) at the Department of 
Agricultural Economics for a period of five years.   
 
Anonymous data will be aggregated with data gathered from other portions of this 
research.  
 
Confidentiality: Your interview will be transcribed by Ms. Viktoriya Galushko and by 
Mr. Emmanouil Oikonomou or by a confidential secretary.  After your interview, and 
prior to any data being included in a final report, you will be given the opportunity to 
review the transcript of your interview, and to add, alter, or delete information from the 
transcripts as you see fit. Interview transcripts will be seen only by Dr. Gray, Dr. Fulton, 
Mr. Oikonomou and Ms. Galushko. 
 
The research conclusions will be published in a variety of formats, both print and 
electronic. These materials may be further used for purposes of conference 
presentations, or publication in academic journals, books or popular press. In these 
publications, the data will be reported in a manner that protects confidentiality and the 
anonymity of participants. Participants will be identified without names being used, 
giving minimal information if this information is relevant.  Pseudonyms or composite 
profiles may be used to disguise identity further, if necessary. In principle, actual names 
will not be used; however, leaders whose position involves speaking on behalf of the 
organization may be asked if certain comments they have made can be attributed to 
them by name in publications. Any communication of these results that has clear 
potential to compromise your public anonymity will not proceed without your approval. 
 
Right to Withdraw: You may withdraw from the study for any reason, at any time, 
without penalty of any sort. If you choose to withdraw from the study, any information 
that you have contributed will be deleted. You will be informed of any major changes 
that occur in the circumstances of this study or in the purpose and design of the research 
that may have a bearing on your decision to remain as a participant. 
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Questions: If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to contact 
the Researchers at the number provided above. 
 
This study was approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
Behavioural Sciences Research Ethics Board on October 13th 2006.  Any questions 
regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee through the 
Office of Research Services (966-2084). 
 
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided above; I 
have been provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been 
answered satisfactorily.  I consent to participate in the study described above, 
understanding that I may withdraw this consent at any time.  A copy of this consent form 
has been given to me for my records.   
 
 
__________________________   _________________ 
(Signature of Participant)         (Date) 
 
 
__________________________   _________________ 
(Signature of Researcher)         (Date) 
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Interview Transcript Release Form 
 
Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Breeding in Canada 
 
I, __________________________________, have reviewed the complete transcript of 
my interview responses for this study, and have been provided with the opportunity to 
add, alter, and delete information from this transcript as appropriate. I hereby authorize 
the release of this transcript to the Department of Agricultural Economics, University of 
Saskatchewan, to be used in the manner described in the Interview Consent Form (a), or 
the manner indicated below.    
 
If you do not check one of the following, it will be assumed that (a) applies: 
 
________ (a) I prefer to remain anonymous, as described in the consent form.  I 
understand that my remarks will not be attributed to me by name. Instead, they 
may be attributed to an unnamed individual (a manager, a board member etc.) or 
to a pseudonym or a composite profile. 
 
________ (b) The remarks contained in the authorized transcript may be 
attributed to me by name, or used anonymously, at the author's discretion. 
 
________ (c) I prefer to have all remarks from the authorized transcript 
attributed to me by name if they are used. 
 
________ (d) Certain remarks I have indicated by initials in the margin are to be 
kept anonymous as in (a) above; the rest of my comments (unmarked in the 
margins) may be attributed to me. 
 
I have received a copy of this Interview Transcript Release Form for my own records. 
 
_________________________ _________________________ 
Participant Date 
 
 
_________________________ _________________________ 
Researcher Date 
 
Emmanouil Oikonomou (Researcher) 
Graduate Student, Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
306.966.4046 
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